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 ABSTRACT 
 The Canadian government has been holding an inconsistent position in the agricultural 
trade negotiations of both the Uruguay and Doha rounds. It has been advocating for freer 
agricultural trade while defending its supply management system, a protectionist policy that 
governs dairy, poultry and eggs in the country.  
 The thesis attempts to answer the question: What domestic factors explain the inconsistent 
position, advocating for both liberalization and protectionism, that Canada has been advocating in 
the Uruguay and Doha rounds of negotiations on agriculture since 1985? The thesis starts with 
the assumption that the Canadian government has had a preference for free trade and market-
based economic policies since the 1980s. The question is therefore less about explaining 
Canada’s dual position, but rather about explaining why Canada continues to defend supply 
management, a system that appears to be in contradiction with its policy preferences. The 
explanation resides in two ideas.  
 The first argument is that Canada has continued to defend supply management because of 
the preponderant influence of the farmers’ organizations of the supply-managed sectors. Among 
Canadian farmers’ organizations, those from the supply-managed sectors have an unparalleled 
level of organizational capacities. The farmers from the dairy, poultry and egg industries are 
represented by the organizations that have the highest budgets and number of employees. They 
have developed strong coalitions provincially and nationally. Farmers’ organizations from the 
supply-managed sectors have therefore been able to effectively lobby the Canadian government.  
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  The second argument is that supply management has continued to be defended because it 
is foremost in the interest of Ontario and Quebec. Indeed, supply-managed farms are heavily 
concentrated in the Central provinces. This has led the influential provincial governments of 
Quebec and Ontario to be strong advocates of supply management, both on the national and on 
the international scenes. Additionally, electoral reasons have also motivated the support of the 
system by all major national political parties. Supply-managed farms are present in swing rural 
ridings. Furthermore, the Bloc Québécois has become an ardent defender of the system and the 
federal government has also maintained the status quo in order not to heighten Québec 
nationalism, at a time when Canada was shaken by national disunity. Finally, supply-
management farmers’ organizations have been able to influence government effectively because 
of the corporatist relationships they have developed with the federal and provincial governments, 
especially in Quebec and Ontario. They have garnered the support of part of the processing 
industry. Processors are divided on the issue of supply management, but several of the most 
important Canadian processors are cooperatives that are farmer-owned. Important financial 
institutions have also supported the system, valuing the stability offered by the supply-managed 
industries.   
 Supply management has therefore continued to be defended by the federal government in 
GATT/WTO agricultural trade negotiations because of the organizational capacities of supply-
management farmers’ organizations. These capacities are in turn heightened by electoral politics, 
regional concentration and the structure of the system which has made government and 
organizations partners.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Agriculture has long stood out as a special case in multilateral trade negotiations. It has 
been a subject of negotiations since the 1980s, and a hotly debated one at that, at the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which morphed into the World Trade Organization in 1995. The 
Uruguay Round (1986-1994) included agriculture as a negotiation theme for the first time and it 
was included again in the subsequent round of Doha (2001-). Like other economic areas, member 
countries negotiate over international trade rules. The affirmed goal of the negotiations is to 
liberalize agricultural trade, but countries disagree over the level of liberalization that should be 
targeted and the specific modalities under which trade should be made freer. The positions held 
by the countries participating in the negotiations accordingly cover a wide spectrum. On one end 
of the range, highly competitive countries such as Australia and New Zealand argue for a near-
complete liberalization, including an elimination of export subsidies, and a drastic reduction of 
domestic support and tariffs1. On the other end the United States and the European Union want to 
continue to protect their agricultural sector, although the details of their respective positions are 
different. Developing countries are asking for more access to the agricultural markets of Western 
countries and for special and differential treatment in the prescriptions. Somewhere in the middle, 
Canada holds a nuanced, but contradictory position.  
In both the Uruguay and Doha rounds Canada  advocated, and still advocates for, a deep 
liberalization of agricultural trade, while at the same time strongly defending the survival of its 
supply management system. In more detail, Canada suggests an elimination of export subsidies, 
an important reduction of domestic support, a substantial increase in market access, and the 
1 Hermelin and Tavernier, “Les négociations agricoles à l’OMC : État des lieux,” 16-17. 
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 maintenance of Canada’s supply-management system2. Supply management is the protectionist 
system that governs dairy, poultry and eggs in Canada; it entails important import barriers. 
Canada therefore advocates for both liberalization and protectionism; for both reform and for the 
status quo. In that sense, Canada’s position has been an inconsistent, if not contradictory, one. 
The Canadian government has been criticized throughout the latest multilateral trade negotiation 
rounds by several countries on the international scene, but its position has remained the same 
over the last 30 years.   
 The thesis aims at answering the following research question: What domestic factors 
explain the inconsistent position, advocating for both liberalization and protectionism, that 
Canada has been advocating in the Uruguay and Doha rounds of negotiations on agriculture since 
1985? The thesis starts with the assumption that the Canadian government has had a preference 
for free trade and market-based economic policies since the 1980s. The question is therefore less 
about explaining Canada’s dual position, but rather about explaining why Canada continues to 
defend supply management, a system that appears to be in contradiction with its policy 
preferences. The explanation resides in two ideas.  
 The first argument is that Canada has continued to defend supply management because of 
the preponderant influence of the farmers’ organizations of the supply-managed sectors. Among 
Canadian farmers’ organizations, those from the supply-managed sectors have an unparalleled 
level of organizational capacities. The farmers from the dairy, poultry and egg industries are 
represented by organizations that have the highest budgets and number of employees. They have 
2 “Opening Doors to the World 2003 - Agriculture,” DFAIT, accessed October 16, 2011, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/cimar-
rcami/2003/2003_2.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
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 developed strong coalitions provincially and nationally. Farmers’ organizations from the supply-
managed sectors have therefore been able to effectively lobby the Canadian government.  
 The second argument is that supply management has continued to be defended because it 
is foremost in the political and economic interests of Ontario and Quebec, Canada’s two largest 
provinces. Indeed, supply-managed farms are heavily concentrated in these Central provinces. 
This concentration has led the influential provincial governments of Quebec and Ontario to be 
strong advocates of supply management, both on the national and on the international scenes. 
Additionally, electoral reasons have also motivated the support of the system by all major 
national political parties. Furthermore, the Bloc Québécois has become an ardent defender of the 
system and the federal government has also maintained the status quo in order not to heighten 
Québec nationalism and separatism, at a time when Canada was shaken by national disunity. 
Finally, supply-management farmers’ organizations have been able to influence government 
effectively because of the corporatist relationships they have developed with the federal and 
provincial governments, especially in Quebec and Ontario. They have garnered the support of 
part of the processing industry and important financial institutions have also supported the 
system, valuing the stability offered by the supply-managed industries.   
 The next section, the thesis’ first chapter, provides contextual information on agricultural 
trade negotiations, Canada’s agricultural sector and its position, and supply management. The 
second chapter is a literature review. It gives an overview of research done on Canadian 
agricultural policy, on the relationships between interest groups and government, as well as on 
subjects of Canadian politics relevant to this topic such as federalism and central Canada 
dominance. Furthermore, this thesis hopes to contribute to the existing literature in three areas. 
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 First, it contributes to debates on the explanatory factors of foreign policy. In this regard, it 
complements the literature which describes the importance of domestic factors in the elaboration 
of foreign policy. Second, it provides additional evidence in demonstrating that domestic interest 
groups do influence foreign policy, at least in trade. There is some debate as to whether interest 
groups influence foreign policy or if their influence is limited to domestic politics. The third area 
to which the research contributes is the relation between federalism and foreign policy. The 
literature review therefore also explores each of these three sub-fields. The third chapter outlines 
the methodology used throughout the research. The fourth and fifth chapters are the core of the 
thesis, the analysis. The fourth chapter presents the first argument about the lobbying power of 
the supply-managed organizations and the fifth chapter centres on the second argument about the 
concentration of supply management in Quebec and Ontario. The final chapter provides a 
conclusion to the thesis.  
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 CHAPTER ONE: CONTEXT 
 
Agriculture trade and multilateral trade negotiations 
 
 Since the end of the Second World War, the international trade of goods and services has 
been governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became part of 
the newly created World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The goal of the GATT has been to 
liberalize trade and member countries have initiated successive rounds of negotiations3 to find an 
agreement on international trade rules4. Every negotiation round has aimed at furthering 
liberalization, by deepening free trade in a trade area that was negotiated earlier, or by integrating 
new trade areas to global rules. Agriculture was first integrated in the negotiations that led to the 
GATT, in the 1940s, but mainly as a result of pressure from the United States, it remained 
exempted from trading rules until the 1980s5. It was indeed included as a trade area in the GATT 
negotiations, but due to pressure from the United States, Article XI of the GATT was 
incorporated, allowing protectionist measures to be put in place for agriculture and fisheries if in 
parallel production was controlled. The United States already had a policy to allow import quotas 
in agriculture, regardless of production control. In 1951, the US Congress voted for its domestic 
policy to override Article XI, which the GATT disputed. “Congress emerged triumphant in this 
dispute in 1955, when the United States secured a broad waiver, with no time limit, from its 
3 A list of the GATT and WTO negotiation rounds: Geneva Round (1947), Annecy Round (1949), Torquay Round 
(1951), Geneva Round II (1955-59), Dillon Round (1960-62), Kennedy Round (1962-67), Tokyo Round (1973-79), 
Uruguay Round (1986-94), and Doha Round (2001-). 
4 “The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh,” WTO, accessed July 15, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm. 
5 Coleman, “Agricultural Trade and the World Trade Organization,” 72-74. 
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 article XI obligations6.” In addition, Article XVI of the GATT exempted agriculture from the ban 
on export subsidies.  
In 1955, article XVI was amended to read that export subsidies were not to be used 
to gain “more than an equitable share of world export trade.” The meaning of the 
term “an equitable share” remained vague. The United States in 1958 refused to 
accept a proposal by other states for a total ban on export subsidies in agriculture. 
Accordingly, when the CAP was conceived in the 1960s, export “restitutions” joined 
variable levies as key policy instruments for protecting the common market in 
agriculture in the EEC7. 
Because of both these reasons, agriculture was in practice not submitted to trading rules until the 
1980s. It was only brought again on the negotiation table in the Uruguay Round. The round was 
launched in 1986, negotiations lasted until 1994 and the agreement came into effect in 1995. The 
1995 agreement included the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which swallowed 
the GATT and added numerous other agreements. 
 
Uruguay Round 
 Until the Uruguay Round, agriculture had been considered an exceptional economic 
sector that should remain protected and therefore exempted from international trading rules. 
Indeed, agriculture has generally been shielded from international competition and subsidized in 
Western countries since the end of WWII; academics have said a state-assistance paradigm has 
defined Western agricultural policy over that period8. After the end of the war, governments 
intervened in the agricultural sector – by providing export subsidies, rising import tariffs, 
6 Coleman, “Agricultural Trade and the World Trade Organization,” 73. 
7 Ibid., 72-73. 
8 Halpin, Surviving Global Change?, xi-xii. 
6 
 
                                                          
 implementing price support programs, etc.9 – to increase farmers’ revenues and the productivity 
of farming10. Anania indicates that when calculating the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), a 
measure of the public support provided to agriculture in each country, 80 per cent of the world’s 
AMS is concentrated in the United States, the European Union and Japan11. In contrast, 
agriculture tends to be taxed rather than subsidized in developing countries12. For one, 
governments in developing nations often lack the financial capacities to support domestic 
farmers. Furthermore, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) implemented by the World 
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s encouraged a lowering of 
public support to agriculture; sometimes program conditions even included interdictions to tariff 
agricultural imports13. In this context, one of the intents of the integration of agriculture in the 
Uruguay Round was to provide a level-playing field for international agricultural trade by finding 
common ground on eliminating trade barriers to agricultural products14. 
 Both the Uruguay and Doha rounds of negotiations have included agriculture as one of the 
negotiation themes, which totalled 15 in the former and 21 in the latter. And in both rounds 
member countries have adopted a wide diversity of positions and strong divisions have made 
negotiations on agriculture one of the most difficult to conclude. The negotiations are articulated 
around three pillars: export subsidies, domestic support and market access, which mainly relate to 
tariffs. The main players in the negotiations on agriculture are the United States and the European 
9 “Agriculture: explanation,” WTO, accessed July 14, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro01_intro_e.htm. 
10 Halpin, Surviving Global Change?, xi-xii. 
11 Anania and Bureau, “The Negociations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round,” 545. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Madeley, Food for All, 119. 
14 “Agriculture: explanation,” WTO, accessed July 14, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro01_intro_e.htm. 
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 Union15. The Cairns Group is also an important participant. This coalition groups 19 agro-
exporters, among which Canada, and was formed in 1986 at Australia’s initiative. It advocates for 
a strong liberalization of agricultural trade through the elimination of export subsidies and a 
drastic reduction of domestic support and tariffs16. The United States, on the other hand, 
proposed an elimination of export subsidies, to which the European Union and Japan were 
opposed17, and a lesser reduction of domestic support and tariffs18. The EU was suggesting a 
reduction of export subsidies, domestic support and tariffs19.  Strong divisions oppose 
agricultural export countries, such as the members of the Cairns Group, who are wary of gaining 
access to new markets to increase their exports, and countries that are dependent on import for 
their national food consumption and who are concerned about the impact of deep liberalization 
on their vulnerability and on their inward-looking agricultural production.  
 Agriculture negotiations in the Uruguay Round were tedious. They finally resulted in the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that came into force in 1995. Following are the details of the 
agreement, organized around the three pillars. For export subsidies, the AoA prescribed a 
reduction of 36 per cent in value or 21 per cent in volume over six years for developed countries 
and a reduction of 14 per cent in value and 24 per cent in volume over ten years for developing 
countries. As for domestic support, the AoA classified programs into coloured “boxes”: amber, 
blue and green. The amber box incorporated programs that distort trade and a limit was put on 
their use: five per cent of agricultural production for developed countries and ten per cent for 
developing countries. The blue box “is the ‘amber box with conditions’ — conditions designed to 
15 Watkins, “WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Problems and Ways Ahead,” accessed August 4, 2013, 
http://www.l20.org/publications/2_7y_A_S_Watkins.pdf, 1. 
16 Hermelin and Tavernier, “Les négociations agricoles à l’OMC : État des lieux,” 16-17. 
17 Globe and Mail, “U.S. trade plan drives wedge between farmers.” 
18 Hermelin and Tavernier, “Les négociations agricoles à l’OMC : État des lieux,” 12. 
19 Ibid., 17. 
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 reduce distortion. Any support that would normally be in the amber box, is placed in the blue box 
if the support also requires farmers to limit production20”. No limit was put on blue-box 
support21. The green box refers to domestic support that does not or minimally distorts trade. 
There is no limit on this type of support22. As for market access, import tariffs were to be reduced 
by 36 per cent on average for developed countries, with a minimum of 15 per cent on each 
product category, over six years. Developing countries had to reduce them by 24 per cent on 
average, with a minimum of ten per cent on each product category, over ten years. 
 The AoA has been criticized by many. Some observers state loops in the agreement 
allowed developed countries to go around many of the prescriptions. For example, 
Michalopoulos claims that domestic support in developed countries for products of interest for 
developing countries was not reduced and export subsidies were not lowered23. Panagariya 
argues that on average, developing countries reduced their import tariffs more than developed 
countries after the agreement24. There was a view that gains made from the AoA were 
unbalanced between developed and developing nations.  
 
Doha Round 
 The Doha Round was launched in Qatar in 2001 and included agriculture once again. 
Although it was scheduled to end in 2005, negotiations have not ended yet and have reached a 
20 “Agriculture Negotiations: Background Fact Sheet,” WTO, accessed July 10, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm. 
21 Ibid. 
22 “Agriculture Negotiations: Backgrounder,” WTO, accessed July 10, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd07_domestic_e.htm. 
23 Michalopoulos, Developing Countries in the WTO, 111. 
24 Panagariya, “Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy Analysis,” 1220-1221. 
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 deadlock, in part because of the contentious agricultural negotiations25. The objective of the 
negotiations on agriculture was to deepen liberalization of agricultural trade. The European 
Union and the United States are once again the two main players in the negotiations, but the 
Cairns Group, Japan and developing countries are also active participants. All of these countries 
have adopted very similar positions to those adopted in the Uruguay Round. The WTO reports 
Doha Round agricultural negotiations convened 37 country delegations, through which were 
represented 14 negotiation coalitions (see Appendix A). Some of the coalitions have specifically 
been formed for the purpose of the agricultural negotiations while others are coalitions that 
participate on several negotiation areas. It has proven to be very difficult to reconcile the very 
divergent positions of the different participating countries. 
 
Canada’s position 
 
 Canada has advocated a very similar position in both rounds of negotiations. Like the 
United States and the Cairns Group, of which it is part, it has been proposing an elimination of 
export subsidies and an important reduction of domestic support26. In terms of market access, the 
Canadian government has been advocating for a substantive increase in access. The fourth and 
last part of Canada’s position is the defence of supply management, the protectionist system that 
governs dairy, poultry and egg productions in the country. The Canadian position is a 
contradictory one. The federal government has been advocating for a deep liberalization of 
25 Pakpahan, “Deadlock in the WTO”, accessed July 30, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/art19.htm; “WTO Deadlocked Over 
Agriculture,” BBC News, December 17, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4537246.stm.  
26 Drohan, “Canada at Odds with Trade Group.” 
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 agricultural trade while continuing to strongly defend the policy that protects dairy, poultry and 
egg productions, by imposing stringent import quotas and high tariffs.  
The position has been opposed by Canada’s main trading partners. Canadian negotiators 
have at times recognized their position may appear inconsistent, although they believe it is 
defendable. For example, in 1990, “Agriculture Minister Donald Mazankowski said the Cairns 
Group has come to terms with Canada’s position. He called Canada’s defence of supply 
management ‘a small inconsistency’ in terms of the negotiating positions”27. More recently, 
“Gilles Gauthier, Canada’s chief negotiator on agriculture in the Doha Round, [testified] to the 
effect that Canada’s position on supply management is ‘extreme and difficult to defend’”28. Still, 
in 1992, “Ottawa characterize[d] its approach as ‘balanced’”29. The Canadian government 
continuously claims to unwaveringly defend supply management, as its periodic reassuring 
public statements demonstrate, but the previous quotes also show that it has been aware it is a 
difficult position to hold.    
 The strategy to secure the survival of supply management has been different in the two 
rounds. Until the start of the Uruguay Round, supply management was permitted by Article XI of 
the GATT. Article XI allowed import quotas on agricultural productions that were restricted to 
the domestic market and therefore were not exported and, by extension, not trade distorting30. In 
the Uruguay Round, Canada aimed at clarifying and reinforcing Article XI in order to be able to 
keep supply management31. In 1989, during the Uruguay Round negotiations, a GATT panel 
ruled that Canada’s import quotas on ice cream and yogurt were illegal. Canada did not appeal 
27 Drohan, “Canada at Odds with Trade Group.” 
28 Globe and Mail, “MPs as Trade Barriers.” 
29 Fagan, “Farmers’ Backs to the Tariff Wall.” 
30  “GATT 1947: Article XI,” GATT, http://www.wto.org/french/docs_f/legal_f/gatt47_01_f.htm#articleXI. 
31 Solomon, “Canada Will Ask GATT to Shield Dairy, Poultry.” 
11 
 
                                                          
 the ruling, but stated it would make the appropriate changes only after the Uruguay Round was 
concluded. Canada therefore also hoped that the clarification of Article XI would permit quotas 
on products made fully or mainly from supply-managed products and indirectly nullify the 
ruling32. The Canadian stance on the defence of import quotas had little support among other 
countries. Through 1990 and 1991, Canada tried to convince the European Union to support the 
idea of keeping import quotas for sensitive products, but in 1992 the EU announced it would not 
support the idea. And although in 1992 Canada seemed to have the support of Japan, South 
Korea, Israel, Switzerland and Norway33, in 1993 it had lost these allies according to the 
Canadian press34.  
 Canada was in the end unsuccessful in maintaining Article XI. In 1991 the director 
general of the GATT, Arthur Denkel, suggested a draft final agreement which made no mention 
of the article in question. The framework agreement proposed, among other things, that non-tariff 
barriers such as Canada’s import quotas on dairy, poultry and eggs, be changed into tariff barriers 
and that in turn they be reduced over six years35. Although Canada opposed tariffication36, it 
signed the final agreement in 1994. Already in 1993, it had made public the tariffs it was going to 
implement on supply-managed goods: 192 per cent on eggs, 280 per cent on chicken, 283 per 
cent on fluid milk and 351 per cent on butter, among others37.  
 In the Doha Round, Canada’s position also aimed at preserving supply management, 
although Canada’s strategy was cosmetically different. Like in the Uruguay Round, the Canadian 
32 Solomon, “Canada Will Ask GATT to Shield Dairy, Poultry.” 
33 Gwyn, “Wilson Fighting Against the Odds at GATT Talks.” 
34 Toronto Star, “Farmers Urge Chrétien to Back Quota System.” 
35 Pitts, “Against All Odds Down on Dairy Farm.” 
36 Fagan, “Farmers’ Backs to the Tariff Wall.” 
37 Bryan, “The Geniuses in Ottawa Are Buying Farmers’ Votes With Our Money.” 
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 government proposes an elimination of export subsidies and a drastic reduction of domestic 
support and import tariffs. To keep supply management, Canada suggests that decisions relative 
to production and marketing remain national38. Canada’s position has been openly criticized by 
many countries. For example, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand claimed they intended to 
take aim at Canadian supply management when the Doha Round was launched39, revealing an 
open split in the Cairns Group.  
 The United States has also consistently been asking for a dismantlement of supply 
management. During the negotiations that led to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
and again for the North American Free Trade Agreement, the United States was unsuccessful 
despite strong lobbying efforts: supply management was awarded an exemption40. After the AoA, 
the US challenged Canada over the claim that tariffication of supply-managed products was 
illegal within NAFTA, but a NAFTA panel ruled against the United States in 199641. Then again 
in 1997, the United States, with New Zealand, challenged Canada’s subsidized exports of ice 
cream and cheese at the WTO. The WTO panel ruled against Canada, which rearranged its policy 
to not directly set export prices – the US and NZ were challenging Canada for setting export 
prices lower. This decision was appealed by the US and NZ, who won in 2001. The decision was 
in turn appealed by Canada, who won and did not have to further change its policy42. In 
summary, Canada’s supply management system has been strongly and consistently, but not 
successfully, opposed by the United States, Australia and New Zealand, among others. 
38 “Opening Doors to the World 2003 - Agriculture,” DFAIT, accessed October 16, 2011, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/cimar-
rcami/2003/2003_2.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
39 Toronto Star, “Negotiations Target Supply-Management System.” 
40 McCarthy, “Dairy, Poultry, Egg Marketing Survive One Round of Talks.” 
41 Financial Post, “Supply Management Hits Consumers in Pocket-Book.” 
42 National Post, “Canada’s Dairy Exports Still Face Trade Scrutiny.” 
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 Agricultural trade and protectionism in Canada   
 
 Agriculture is an important economic activity in Canada. Agricultural production “and the 
agri-food system provided one in eight jobs and accounted for 8 per cent of total GDP in 2006” 
and Canada was the fourth largest exporter of agricultural products in the world in 200743. A big 
portion of Canada’s agricultural production is exported: about 45 per cent in 200644. Canada’s 
main agricultural exports in 2010 were, in order from the most important: wheat, 
rapeseed/canola, pork and soybeans45.  
 The Canadian agricultural sector can roughly be divided into two sub-sectors: the supply-
managed industries (dairy, chicken, turkey, table eggs and hatching eggs) and the industries 
dependent on export (beef, pork, grains and oilseeds)46. These two sub-sectors have very 
different interests and ideologies47. On the one hand the supply managed sectors’ market is 
domestic and they are dependent on protectionist measures for the system to function. They argue 
for the status quo and support government intervention in the agricultural sector. On the other 
hand beef, pork, grains and oilseed producers are dependent on exportation, as only part of their 
production is sold on the Canadian market. They therefore have strong interests in accessing new 
foreign markets. They are advocates of free trade and liberalization and have clear stakes in the 
WTO negotiations. They positively view the goal of liberalizing agricultural trade and of 
instituting trade rules and a level-playing field in international agricultural trade. They usually 
43 “Overview of the Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food System 2008,” Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
accessed July 12, 2013, http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1228246364385. 
44 Ibid. 
45 “Top Exports – Canada – 2010,” FAOStat, accessed July 7, 2013, http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx. 
46 Skogstad, “The Uphill Struggle to Prevail,” 192-194. 
47 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 331. 
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 ask for the dismantlement of supply management. They fear that Canada, by defending supply 
management in its foreign trade policy, threatens further market access gains48. 
 
Supply management 
 
 Supply management is the system under which dairy, chicken, turkey, table-egg and 
hatching-egg production are governed in Canada. The system is based on three pillars: (a) the 
control of production through quota allocation; (b) import limitations through high tariffs and; (c) 
product prices calculated based on production costs49. In simple words, supply management aims 
to equalize supply and demand in order for prices to remain stable and relatively high. Because 
prices are not set by market forces directly, it allows for stable revenues that cover costs of 
production50. However, for this system to function, import restrictions are required. In this 
important respect, supply management is therefore protectionist. Supply management has mainly 
been developed in order to avoid chronic overproduction and which resulted in frequent low 
prices, exemplified by the ‘chicken and egg war’ of the 1960s51.  
 Before the Uruguay Round, the products under supply management were submitted to 
import quotas. At the beginning of the negotiations, Canada allowed about 2,5 per cent of its 
dairy products52 and 7,5 per cent of its chicken to be imported53. As the AoA ruled out import 
quotas and prescribed for them to be transformed into tariffs, Canada put in place high import 
48 Skogstad, “Federalism and Agricultural Marketing,” 91-92. 
49 “WTO and Agriculture – Supply Management,” GO5 Coalition, accessed July 15, 2013, 
http://www.go5quebec.ca/en/gestion.php. 
50 Wilson, Farming the System, 169. 
51 Janigan, “Why Chickens Don’t Come Cheap.” 
52 Thompson, “Dairy Industry Fears Disaster Without Fixed Prices, Quotas.” 
53 Veigle, “Canada’s Trade Laws Lay an Egg With U.S. Chicken Producers.” 
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 tariffs on the products under supply management. The result was the same: imports of dairy, 
poultry and egg products were heavily restricted. As mentioned earlier, the tariffs Canada put as a 
result of the AoA were: 192 per cent on eggs, 280 per cent on chicken, 283 per cent on fluid milk 
and 351 per cent on butter54. Those tariffs, along with Canada’s other agricultural tariffs, had to 
be reduced over six years by 36 per cent on average, with a minimum of 15 per cent on each tariff 
line. Since Canada put tariffs on supply-managed products at a very high level in 1995, the tariffs 
remained high after the reduction. In 2010, tariffs for the same products were: 163 per cent on 
eggs, 238 to 253 per cent on chicken, 241 per cent on fluid milk and 298 to 313 per cent on 
butter55. In contrast, the level of Canadian import tariffs for agricultural goods was on average 22 
per cent in 201056. 
 Supply management functions under a rather complex structure. To be able to produce 
milk, chicken or eggs, farmers must purchase production quotas. Each province has marketing 
boards, one for every supply-managed sector. Provincial marketing boards set prices for the 
commodities (fluid milk, butter, etc.) and allocate quotas. Farmers therefore buy the quotas from 
the marketing board. Provincial marketing boards are in turn overseen by a national agency, 
again one for every supply-managed sector. Finally, the national agencies are governed by the 
National Farm Products Marketing Council.  
 Marketing boards do not only exist in the supply-managed sectors though. In 1982, 
Canada counted 102 marketing boards, some in pork, wool, mushrooms, etc. At the time, 39 of 
those boards had supply-management powers57. Farmers have formed marketing boards to put 
54 Bryan, “The Geniuses in Ottawa Are Buying Farmers’ Votes With Our Money.” 
55 Simpson, “Everyone Knows Canada’s a Double-Dealer in World Trade.” 
56 Ivison, “Is EU Trade Prize Worth a Few Changes?” 
57 Globe and Mail, “Halt Is Sought on Farm Boards.” 
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 their resources together and coordinate the marketing of their products. The boards mainly 
promote the product, fund research and sometimes farmers grant the organization the power to 
negotiate with processors or other types of buyers58. Agricultural producers therefore have much 
more negotiating power. Rather than each farmer negotiating with the processor or retailer, 
members negotiate as a group. Marketing boards in the supply-managed sector have more 
authority. They can fix prices and allocate quota and they have a granted monopoly in a given 
sector. This power has been granted by the federal law of 1972, the Farm Products Marketing 
Agencies Act59. 
 This act allowed poultry and egg marketing boards the power to fix prices and allocate 
quotas and with it the system of supply management was gradually built throughout Canada in 
the 1970s. A dairy national agency had already been formed in 1966, the Canadian Dairy 
Commission, to stabilize the price of milk for processing. It operated as a selling agency. Dairy 
became supply-managed in 1970 with the creation of the Canadian Milk Supply Management 
Committee60.  
 Marketing boards existed well before the 1970s, although they did not have the special 
authority that was mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
First coming together in groups, farmers started to act in unison to guarantee 
themselves greater market stability in the face of unpredictable production cycles. For 
example, they set common floor prices which their members respected. Early farm 
organizations lacked leverage, however, and therefore turned to provincial 
governments to create marketing boards. These boards were either government-
sanctioned producer groups or appointed bodies, with legally binding, province-wide 
58 Wilson, Farming the System, 168. 
59 “History of Supply Management,” Chicken Farmers of Canada, accessed July 12, 2013, 
http://chickenfarmers.ca/chicken-industry/history-of-supply-management. 
60 “History of the CDC,” Canadian Dairy Commission, accessed July 12, 2013, http://www.cdc-
ccl.gc.ca/CDC/index-eng.php?id=3793. 
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 authority to conduct such marketing activities as pricing and production management 
to meet demand through marketing quotas61. 
The act also established national marketing agencies and the National Farm Products Marketing 
Council62. The national egg agency was formed in 1972, the turkey agency in 1973, the chicken 
agency in 1978 and the hatching egg one in 1986. The system for dairy was set up in 1966 
independently as the Canadian Dairy Commission, which set industrial milk prices63. The price 
of industrial milk then had a direct impact on the price of fluid milk. 
 Provinces already had marketing boards before 1972, but they were all independent from 
one another. During the 1960s, interprovincial battles occured on different agricultural products. 
Hostilities commenced in Quebec in 1966 when the Quebec egg farmers established 
FEDCO, the Quebec egg marketing board, to set the wholesale price for all eggs sold 
in the province. Egg suppliers from other provinces such as Ontario and Manitoba 
refused to co-operate with FEDCO. A black market for eggs arose. The Quebec 
Provincial Police seized illicit eggs. Quebec egg producers overturned contraband egg 
truckloads. The counterattack came when Ontario introduced legislation to exclude 
Quebec broiler chickens, and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick threatened to do the 
same64. 
 
There ensued a back-and-forth of blackmailing between provinces. “The only solution was a 
federal-provincial agreement”65 and from there came the federal act that would put in place 
supply management. Because uncoordinated interprovincial movements of products created 
uncertainty and continuously undermined farmers of one province to the advantage of those from 
another province – processors from one province could import cheaper products from another 
61 “Supply Management,” Canadian Dairy Commission, accessed July 12, 2013, http://www.cdc-
ccl.gc.ca/CDC/index-eng.php?id=3806. 
62 Janigan, “Why Chickens Don’t Come Cheap.” 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
18 
 
                                                          
 province for example – there was a willingness to create a Canadian integrated system of 
production and marketing for agriculture. The system was, in addition to the chicken and egg 
wars, also strongly motivated by a willingness to increase revenues of farmers after several years 
of fluctuating prices as well as the negotiating power of farmers vis-à-vis processors66. The 
government at first wanted to find a solution for agriculture at large, as fluctuating prices and 
revenues were observable in all agricultural sectors. Cattle producers strongly opposed their 
sector being integrated into a supply-managed sector and mainly due to this position, the act that 
permitted supply management was only relevant to poultry and eggs67 and complemented the 
system put in place in dairy in 1970. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 144. 
67 Wilson, Farming the System, 173. 
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 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The thesis aims at answering the research question: What domestic factors explain the 
inconsistent position, advocating for both liberalization and protectionism, that Canada has been 
advocating in the Uruguay and Doha rounds of negotiations on agriculture since 1985?. The 
argument is divided into two parts. Despite the Canadian neo-liberal shift in agriculture, Canada 
defends both liberalization and protectionism because, (1) of the dominant influence of farmers’ 
organizations from the supply management sector; and (2) protectionism is in the interest of 
Ontario and Quebec. The second argument is in turn divided into two components: Canada 
continues to defend supply management because (a) protectionism is in the interest of dominant 
Central Canada; and (3) not to revive Quebec separatism as protectionism is important for 
Quebec agriculture. The first section of the literature review will be divided accordingly. 
 The first part of the literature review starts by discussing previous work that has focused 
on the Canadian government’s position in the Uruguay and Doha rounds. Then will be presented 
literature related to: interest groups and their influence on agricultural policy; theories applicable 
to interest-group influence; work done on Central Canada dominance will be presented; and 
research done on Quebec separatism and more specifically on this force as a prime motivation of 
certain policy outcomes at the federal level.  
In the second part of the review, the more general literature in which the research project 
is situated will be presented. Indeed, the research will hopefully contribute to the literature on: 
domestic versus external determinants of foreign policy, the influence of domestic interest groups 
on foreign policy and federalism and foreign policy. The second part of the literature review will 
20 
 
 therefore discuss the work that has already been done on these three areas of research in order to 
better situate where the findings will fit. 
 
Part 1: Literature specific to the thesis 
Canada’s position in agricultural trade negotiations 
 
 The research question that will guide the thesis has not been the subject of research 
before. The explanations for Canada’s contradictory position in the Uruguay and Doha rounds of 
agricultural negotiations have been examined in a number of academic works, but have not been 
the sole focus of an extensive research. A few academics studying Canadian agricultural policy 
have devoted a section of their work to this question, but that is all. There have been several 
research projects on agricultural trade negotiations in which Canada has taken part, but again, not 
focusing on explaining the position Canada has held in these negotiations.  
 Grace Skogstad has written extensively on Canadian agricultural policy and has touched 
on the subject of agricultural trade negotiations though a number of her pieces of work. For one, 
she has argued that farmers’ organizations from the supply-managed sector have had 
considerable influence over the negotiations of the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement 
and of the Uruguay round68. The United States’ government put a lot of pressure on Canadian 
negotiators for supply management to be dismantled, in order to allow American imports of 
dairy, chicken and eggs. The Canadian government outright refused to negotiate on the subject 
and Skogstad attributes this feature to the preponderant influence of supply-management 
68 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 341-342. 
21 
 
                                                          
 organizations. Skogstad claimed the same dynamics occured for the Uruguay round negotiations, 
where the United States was once more pressing for supply management to be abandoned69. Still, 
Skogstad does not detail the causal mechanism behind her explanation; she does not pinpoint the 
factor that explains what she sees is a preponderant influence of the supply-management farmers’ 
organizations. Skogstad has also argued that the Canadian government’s position mirrored the 
position advocated by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA). The CFA is the most 
important of the two national organizations that represent Canadian farmers generally. She claims 
this is because the federal government and the CFA have strong ties70. Although this last analysis 
might be accurate, it appears to be thin, as it does not take into account the influence of sectoral 
organizations, which Skogstad herself acknowledges in other work.  
 In addition to Skogstad’s work, Andrew Cooper’s book In Between Countries: Australia, 
Canada, and the Search for Order in Agricultural Trade has also importantly contributed to the 
small literature on Canada’s position in agricultural trade. Cooper did a comparative analysis of 
Canada and Australia’s diplomatic strategies in the Uruguay round of agricultural negotiations. A 
few specific elements of Cooper’s analysis are particularly relevant for this research. First, 
Cooper puts forward that the contradiction in Canada’s position is an expression of compromise 
between diverging interests. It is quite obvious that the Canadian government’s position is a 
representation of both the interests of the supply-managed sector and of the export-dependent 
sector. Cooper accordingly argues that compromise is a recurring trait of Canadian politics in 
general:  
69 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 153. 
70 Skogstad, “The Uphill Struggle to Prevail,” 202. 
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 To comprehend the dichotomous nature of Canada’s position, the salience of 
accommodation in Canadian politics must be taken into account. [...] Canadian state 
officials, fearing the risk of division between different societal interests, did not 
present the public with clear choices. On the contrary, Canadian politics favoured the 
art of compromise, whereby abundant efforts were made to satisfy as many interests 
as possible. [...] Given the potential for regional divisions to inflame political 
emotions, everything possible was done to defuse tensions along these lines71. 
  
Cooper also claims that compromise and reconciliation were part of Prime Minister Mulroney’s 
personal style, therefore also explaining the “umbrella” position Canada adopted at the start of 
the Uruguay round72. Furthermore, he explains that there were important divisions between the 
different federal departments involved in the agricultural trade negotiations: the Ministry for the 
Canadian Wheat Board and grains and oilseeds, Ministry of International Trade, Ministry of 
Agriculture. Officials from the different ministries were divided over a willingness to maintain 
the status quo or reform the Canadian agricultural sector and its policies73. There was intense 
disagreement within and between departments74. These cleavages partly explain, according to 
Cooper, the broad and contradictory position the Canadian government was advocating in the 
Uruguay round. Cooper’s explanations are complementary to those of Skogstad as they focus less 
on farmers’ organizations and more on Canadian political culture, bureaucratic bargaining and 
leadership personality and psychology. Cooper does take into account the influence of farmers’ 
organizations, but he also underlines that the broader domestic political context has to be 
included in the equation. 
71 Cooper, In Between Countries, 176. 
72 Ibid., 215. 
73 Ibid., 178-180. 
74 Ibid., 215. 
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 Agricultural interest groups and their influence on agricultural policy 
 
 Although little research has been specifically devoted to Canada’s trade negotiation 
position, there is an extensive body of literature about Canadian farmers’ organizations. The 
influence they exercise on the elaboration of agricultural policy has been discussed on numerous 
occasions75. Skogstad argues that out of the different actors involved in the agricultural sector 
(input corporations, producers, processors, retailers, consumers, etc.), producers have had much 
more influence than others in the post-Second World War period and that this influence is in part 
due to government attitude. Indeed, the federal and provincial governments have voluntarily 
listened to the interests of farmers, more so than to the other actors involved in the sector. Still, 
Skogstad notes that the processing industry has gained more influence since the 1980s. Around 
this period, the federal government, mainly, adopted a more integrative approach to agricultural-
policy making and encouraged the input of the processing industry. The influence of producers 
on Canadian agricultural policy has therefore proportionally declined76. The analyses of Skogstad 
and other authors point to the fact that farmers’ organizations have an important influence on 
Canadian agricultural policy and must therefore also influence the agricultural trade position the 
Canadian government has been advocating. The first argument, which focuses on farmers’ 
organizations, therefore comes from this near-consensus in the literature that farmers’ 
organizations are primary actors. 
 The characteristics of the system of Canadian farmers’ organizations have also been 
described in several pieces of work. One of the basic features of the Canadian agricultural sector 
75 See for example Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada, “The Uphill Struggle to 
Prevail”, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture; Coleman, Business and Politics; Schmitz and al., 
Agricultural Policy, Agribusiness, and Rent-Seeking Behaviour. 
76 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 150; 159. 
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 is the deep schism that divides organizations of the supply-managed sectors and of the export-
dependent sectors77. Indeed, there are roughly two areas of agriculture in Canada: sectors that are 
dependent on export (cereals, oilseeds, pork and beef) and sectors that are dependent on 
protectionist measures (dairy, chicken, turkey, eggs). Their interests are obviously divergent and 
there are important ideological divisions between them78. Sectors dependent on export are strong 
advocates of greater foreign market access and more broadly, of a deep liberalization of 
agricultural trade internationally and of agricultural policy in Canada. They are opposed to supply 
management, mainly because they feel that its defence by the federal government undermines 
Canada’s position of pushing for further market access79. The division of the Canadian 
agricultural sector by production type and interests is common and widely accepted and is 
therefore an important factor that has to be taken into account in this research project. The 
categorization that several authors make is not nuanced. They make rough and approximate 
categories that do not include small productions such as fruits and vegetables, sheep, fish or 
honey. Although authors rarely incorporate marginal productions such as these in their analyses 
and do not explicitly explain why, it seems to be because of the little influence these sectors 
exercise in policy, or because their interests can be amalgamated with those of dominant sectors. 
Like in previous research, it does not appear pertinent to include all agricultural sectors in this 
research. 
 Among these two broad sectors of Canadian agriculture (supply management and export-
dependent), the overwhelming influence of the supply-managed farmers’ groups has been 
77 Skogstad, “The Uphill Struggle to Prevail,” 192-194. 
78 Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs and Paradigms,” 497. 
79 Skogstad, “Federalism and Agricultural Marketing,” 91-92; Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 142. 
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 underlined by several academics, most notably Skogstad80. As mentioned earlier, Skogstad 
attributed the defence of supply management by the Canadian government in the trade talks of 
the Uruguay Round and of the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement to the power and 
influence of the supply-management farmers’ organizations. Furtan and Gray have claimed that 
among these organizations, the dairy organizations are particularly influential81. In addition, 
Skogstad affirms that Quebec dairy organizations are the most influential among the different 
Canadian dairy groups; she claims that if Quebec was to separate, the dairy lobby would lose its 
most prominent voice82. It therefore seems that particular attention has to be devoted to dairy 
organizations.  
 Furthermore, the weakness of the most important national general farmers’ organization, 
the CFA, has been underlined by both Skogstad and Wilson. Canada counts two national general 
farmers’ organizations: the CFA and the National Farmers’ Union (NFU); their objective is to 
represent Canadian farmers as a whole. NFU has remained marginal though. In his book Farming 
the System, Wilson claimed the CFA has had difficulty being an umbrella organization because of 
the deep divisions occurring between its members. Member organizations have not been willing 
to compromise and the CFA has been unable to reconcile the different interests83. Skogstad also 
notes this weakness and complements Wilson’s claim by arguing that sectoral organizations 
(dairy, cattle, etc.) have become much more influential than general organizations, both at the 
federal and provincial levels84. She notes one exception to this trend that has taken place since 
80 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 330-331; Internationalization 
and Canadian Agriculture. 
81 Furtan and Gray, “The Constitutional Debate.” 
82 Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture.” 
83 Wilson, Farming the System, 142. 
84 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 330-331. 
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 1980s: the Union des Producteurs Agricoles (UPA), the provincial general organization that 
represents Quebec farmers. This is in part because UPA is the only farmers’ organization in 
Canada that has a state-granted monopoly. Indeed, the Quebec government passed a law in 1972 
giving the UPA a monopoly to represent all Quebec farmers; membership is therefore mandatory. 
Skogstad also notes the exceptionally strong relationship that exists between UPA and the 
Quebec government, as well as between the Ontario Federation of Agriculture (OFA) and the 
Ontario government85. Wilson also notes that the OFA is a powerful voluntary association of 
farmers in Canada86. In contrast to the power of UPA and OFA, and the well-coordinated 
organizations under supply-management, farmers’ organizations west of Ontario are highly 
fragmented87. These conclusions underline the declining pertinence of the general national 
organizations and the growing relevancy of sectoral organizations. 
 The convergence of interests of the different actors involved in the supply management 
sector is also an important feature that has been demonstrated. Producers, processors and the 
state’s interests are not antagonistic88. Producers benefit from the supply-management system. 
Because supply is controlled so it is equal to demand, revenues earned by farmers are stable and 
are calculated according to production cost and not determined by laws of market. Processors 
have a stable supply of products; the prices they pay for them remain stable (they may be higher 
than in a market-based system, but they may be lower as well). As for the state, the supply 
management system is a successful policy inasmuch as the objectives of the policy have been 
met: it has stabilized prices and farmers’ revenues. In addition, the policy does not involve public 
85 Skogstad, “The Uphill Struggle to Prevail,” 190-191. 
86 Wilson, Farming the System, 137. 
87 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 330. 
88 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 143. 
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 spending89. It has been argued by opponents of supply management that although the state does 
not spend money, costumers bear higher costs of supply-managed products. In other words, 
except maybe the consumers, other actors in the agricultural sector of the economy have similar 
interests. Farmers’ organizations therefore appear to be primary actors, but the interests and 
influence of processors should also be accounted for, as they can reinforce the power of the 
producers. On the other hand, no research has been done on the level of convergence of interests 
of the farmers and processors in the productions dependent on export.  
 In addition, the processing industry has become more and more concentrated over the last 
decades. Skogstad argues that the consolidation of the agri-food processing industry justifies the 
continuous role and responsibilities government take90. Indeed, farmers generally produce on an 
individual basis and therefore marketing organizations allow them to have much more bargaining 
power. Because the processing industry is becoming heavily concentrated, and therefore less 
choice is offered to producers to sell their production, the state feels it has to continue giving 
farmers’ organizations disproportionate influence.    
 Finally, Coleman has extensively studied characteristics of interest groups and the 
relations they develop with government. In his book Business and Politics: A Study in Collective 
Action, he describes two prime roles interest groups can play: policy advocacy and policy 
participation. In very brief words, policy advocacy is when groups try to influence state policy. 
Policy participation is an active role in policy elaboration or policy implementation. Groups that 
exercise policy participation have different characteristics than those who only exercise policy 
advocacy; the former are more “policy capable”. In terms of policy advocacy, features that 
89 Coleman and al., “Paradigm Shifts and Policy Networks,” 294. 
90 Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs and Paradigms,” 503. 
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 determines the scale of influence of a group is its resources: budget, staff, expertise, etc. Coleman 
argues groups need to possess knowledge about the policy process, the political impact of the 
policy and technical knowledge specific to the policy91. In addition, groups must be able to 
mobilize political support; there must be a strong cohesion among its members, easier if the 
interests are narrow and specialized; and their organization must comprise political expertise in 
political intelligence, mobilization and lobbying. In terms of policy participation, these features 
are different. An organization must have the “capability to order and coordinate information and 
activities” and be “autonomous from its members and the state”. The criteria developed by 
Coleman are numerous, but a few examples are the following: organizations must be formed 
around a specific service or product; there should be a separate organization for each service or 
product and the membership of organizations should be mutually exclusive; there should be a 
vertical integration of organizations, with a peak association at the top; and organizations usually 
receive privileges from the state or other actors92. Coleman developed this typology through a 
study of business associations in Canada, including agricultural organizations. He notes though 
that agricultural organizations operate differently from other economic associations. For one, 
agricultural organizations are integrated on bases of territory and commodity that are much more 
pronounced than in other sectors93. Furthermore, they often have developed corporatist 
relationships with the state (corporatism is explained in the next section); although it occurs in 
other sectors, it seems to be characteristic of the agricultural sector. Coleman and others specify 
in later work that in Canadian agriculture, these corporatist relationships occur with supply-
management organizations only. Farmers’ organizations in other provinces and non-supply 
91 Coleman, Business and Politics, 48. 
92 Ibid., 51-57. 
93 Ibid., 45-46. 
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 management groups in central Canada, in contrast, have pressure pluralist relations with 
government94.  The relationship between interest groups and government will be further 
elaborated in the next section.  
 
Pluralism, neo-corporatism and policy networks 
 
 The two main theoretical frameworks used to analyse the influence that interest groups 
exercise on government have traditionally been pluralism and neo-corporatism. Pluralism was the 
main approach used in the 1950s and 1960s and corporatism was developed in reaction to 
observed gaps in the pluralism framework. Let’s start with a definition of both frameworks. 
Schmitter defines pluralism as: 
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an 
unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and 
self-determined (as to type and scope of interest) categories which are not specially 
licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection 
or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of 
representational activity within their respective categories95. 
Cawson defines neo-corporatism as: 
a specific socio-political process in which organisations representing monopolistic 
functional interests engage in political exchange with state agencies over public policy 
outputs which involves those organisations in a role which combines interest 
representation and policy implementation through delegated self-enforcement96. 
In a pluralism system, interest groups are numerous and are in competition with each other both 
for potential members and in terms of influencing the state. The degree of their influence on 
94 Coleman and al., “Paradigm Shifts and Policy Networks,” 285-293. 
95 Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” 96. 
96 Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, 38. 
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 decision-making is determined by the following factors: money, staff, information and most of 
all, the number of members97. The influence that groups have is also linked to the electoral 
process. Governments want to be re-elected and therefore first privilege the interests of the 
organizations that represent the preferences of a large portion of the electorate98. Competition 
between groups is a zero-sum game; benefits won by a group are lost by another99. In a 
corporatist system, interest groups have a monopoly or near-monopoly in a sector of the 
economy. Membership is mandatory. Individuals have only one option for their interests to be 
represented100. The influence of the group is therefore determined by the monopolistic situation it 
holds, and mainly by the privileged relationship it has with the state101. 
 The pluralist model depicts the relation between interest groups and the state as 
unidirectional. The objective pursued by groups is to represent the interests of their members and 
to influence the decisional process in their favour102. On the contrary, the relation is presented as 
bidirectional in the corporatist model. There is a mutual interdependence relation between the 
state and the group. Interest groups can provide information and most of all, can coerce their 
members into following state decisions. The state, on the other hand, can give privileges to 
groups and grant an organization with special status. Both the state and the group have to remain 
autonomous103. Groups are not only consulted; negotiations operate between the state and them. 
Furthermore, the state is independent and not “colonized” by the group. There is therefore a 
privileged relationship between the state and the group and this privilege becomes 
97 Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, 29. 
98 Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective, 53. 
99 Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, 15. 
100 Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective, 96. 
101 Ibid., 9; Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, 14. 
102 Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective, 3. 
103 Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, 19. 
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 institutionalized; the relation becomes stable and change is slow104. Cawson also notes that 
corporatist groups primarily organize themselves around “functional” interests, not around values 
and moral issues. These functional interests are usually economic and producers are the most 
susceptible of economic agents to develop corporatist groups105. 
Finally, the pluralist model conceives the state as an arena where different groups are in 
competition with each other. The state is viewed as an arbiter that harmonizes the interests and 
builds a consensus106. In other words, the state balances the interests of the different groups. 
Some groups are more influential, others are less. Power is not equally distributed among 
organizations, but it is distributed107. In the corporatist model, “the problem of excluded interests 
remains [...]. This is often conceived in terms of weak, poorly organised or underprivileged 
groups being kept away from the warmth of the corporatist earth108”. One group detains a 
monopoly or a near-monopoly in a given sector. Von Beyme explains though that there is no 
corporatism without at least three actors, most commonly capital, workers and the state. The 
corporatist system reconciles the potentially diverging interests of these three actors109. In the 
agricultural sector, these three actors would be the state, farmers and processors110.  
In the 1980s, Cawson developed a new framework in which pluralism and corporatism 
were conceived not as competing but rather as complementary models111. Cawson defines them 
as ideal-types that constitute the two extreme poles of a continuum112. He justifies his new 
104 Grant, The Political Economy of Corporatism, 57. 
105 Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, 12; 81. 
106 Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective, 55. 
107 Ibid., 52 
108 Grant, The Political Economy of Corporatism, 28. 
109 Von Beyme, “Neo-corporatism: a New Nut in an Old Shell?” 176. 
110 Coleman, Business and Politics. 
111 Cawson Corporatism and Political Theory, 31. 
112 Ibid., 39-41. 
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 approach by arguing that most observed cases usually have characteristics of the two models; 
they fit in between these two extremes. Coleman and Atkinson later developed a more precise 
model than Cawson’s. They developed a typology of six types of policy networks: state directed, 
clientele pluralism, corporatism, parentela pluralism, concertation, industry dominant pressure 
pluralism113. Their model is similar to Cawson’s, but it is more nuanced, and they’ve applied it 
to the Canadian agricultural sector.  Both Cawson’s continuum and Coleman and Atkinson’s 
policy networks are useful in this research as Canadian agricultural interest groups do express 
characteristics of both pluralism and corporatism.  
Farmers’ organizations do have a privileged and interdependent relationship with the 
state114. The support of their members is necessary to the implementation of agricultural policies. 
There are several organizations, but they each hold a monopoly or near-monopoly in their 
respective sector (ex. Dairy Farmers of Ontario). We do observe though a competition between 
the supply-management groups and the export-dependent groups in influencing the federal 
government, which is closer to the pluralist model. Membership is usually voluntary, except for 
the Union des Producteurs Agricoles (UPA) in Québec. The corporatist pluralism approach, 
which describes a system where groups compete, but are few in numbers115, would not be 
sufficient in as much that Canadian farmers’ organizations benefit as well from privileged 
relationships with federal and provincial governments and they have converging interests with 
the agri-food industry.  
 
 
113 Coleman and Atkinson, “Strong States and Weak States.” 
114 Skogstad, “The Uphill Struggle to Prevail,” 190-191. 
115 Rokkan, “Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism.” 
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 Central Canada dominance  
 
 Canada’s political system has traditionally been highly brokerage and transactional in 
nature116 and Quebec and Ontario have been said to have an upper hand in federal politics. It has 
been argued and demonstrated that their interests prevail to the detriment of the interests of 
Western and Atlantic Provinces. This dominance has fuelled considerable discontent among 
“peripheral” provinces, particularly in the West117. One of the most cited example to illustrate 
this trend is the National Energy Program introduced by Trudeau in 1981.  
 It has indeed been suggested by several authors that supply management has continued to 
be defended domestically and internationally because it is concentrated in central Canada. Cooper 
underlined that Conservative MPs from Ontario and Quebec and Prime Minister Mulroney, 
during the Uruguay Round, were very concerned about the potential impact of the WTO 
agreement on the livelihoods of supply management farmers in these two provinces118. Skogstad 
also claims that “federal parties and parliamentarians of all stripes have been cognizant of the 
political power of supply management in central Canada: in part a result of swing rural votes in 
large provinces such as Ontario and Quebec, but also in large part a function of the organizational 
strength and coherence of the supply management lobby”119.  
 The latter part of Skogstad’s explanation points to another important element embedded in 
the dominance of central Canada for supply management and that has been mentioned in the 
previous sections: the corporatist relationships the supply-management organizations have 
116 Cooper, In Between Countries, 176. 
117 Braid and Sharpe, Breakup: Why the West Feels Left Out of Canada; Kilgour, Inside Outer Canada. 
118 Cooper, In Between Countries. 
119 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 143. 
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 developed with the Ontario and Quebec governments. In Ontario and Quebec, farmers’ 
organizations are viewed as collaborators by the government and the processors. Both producers 
and processors are consulted by the government when it elaborates new or modifies existing 
agricultural policies. And therefore, because Ontario and Quebec governments have particular 
and close relationships with supply management farmers’ organizations, with whom processors 
have shared interests, these two provincial governments have become strong advocates of supply 
management120. Central Canada dominance therefore seems to be an explanatory factor in federal 
policy outcomes and this has already been acknowledged for the realm of agricultural policy. 
Still, the link has not yet been established between central Canada dominance and the defence of 
supply management internationally by the Canadian government. 
 
Quebec separatism 
 
 The Quebec independence movement is a recurring variable in Canadian politics. It has 
been studied extensively, but what is of particular interest in the context of this research is when 
the Quebec independence movement fuels particular policy outcomes on the federal level. In his 
book National Health Insurance in the United States and Canada, Boychuk tries to identify the 
factors that encouraged the development of national public health insurance in Canada and those 
that prevented this development in the United States121. Boychuk argues that “territorial 
integration” was a determining factor in Canada. He demonstrates that Quebec separatism 
impacted Canadian national unity. The federal government viewed implementation of national 
120 Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs and Paradigms,” 504. 
121 Boychuk, National Health Insurance in the United States and Canada. 
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 public health insurance as a tool of nation-building, as a way of creating a direct link between the 
federal government and Canadian citizens, most notably in Quebec. It wanted to “foster a sense 
of attachment between [citizens of Canada] and the national polity”122. He also explains that 
social policy triggered competitive state-building, as the Quebec government strongly wanted to 
assert its autonomy, and social policy was one of the areas through which it could assert it. 
National public health insurance was gradually put in place in the 1960s and 1970s. Because of 
the referendums on Quebec sovereignty of 1980 and 1995, the federal government expressed 
renewed activism in the realm of national public health in order to show that “federal 
involvement was required to maintain the standards of social programs in Quebec”123. Boychuk 
argued the same factors – competitive nation building and territorial dynamics – explained the 
development of redistributive policies in Canada124. Research such as Boychuk’s demonstrate 
that Quebec separatism can be an independent variable that explains certain policy outcomes at 
the federal level. Supply management is of high interest for Quebec; 30 per cent of Quebec farms 
function under supply management, the highest percentage for all provinces125. Although a 
plausible explanation, it appears that Quebec separatism has never been framed as an explanatory 
factor to the maintenance of supply management. 
 Little has been written on Quebec separatism and agriculture more generally either. 
Belzile stated that farmer support for Quebec sovereignty is not substantially more or less 
prevalent than in the Quebec population in general126. About 50 per cent of Quebec farmers 
supported independence of the province in the 1990s. Furtan and Gray, as mentioned earlier, 
122 Boychuk, National Health Insurance in the United States and Canada, 9. 
123 Ibid., 137. 
124 Boychuk, “Territorial Dynamics and the New Politics of Redistribution in Canada.” 
125 “Population by year, by province and territory,” Statistics Canada, accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm. 
126 Belzile, “Le monde rural appuie la souveraineté.”  
36 
 
                                                          
 demonstrated that the most important consequence of Quebec independence for the Canadian 
agricultural lobby would be in the dairy sector. Sectors that are now protected would become 
more “free trade oriented”127. It has also been mentioned that the UPA endorsed sovereignty in 
1995 and after the referendum’s failure, explicitly asked for agriculture to become an exclusively 
provincial power128. 
 
Part 2: General literature 
 The previous part of the literature review has presented research focusing on Canadian 
agricultural policy and on which the present research builds. It is now useful to turn to the more 
general literature in which the research inscribes itself. This second part is divided into three 
sections. Each gives a broad overview of a sub-field to which the research hopes to contribute. 
The first section describes the debate around domestic versus external determinants of foreign 
policy. The second section outlines in big strokes general key findings in research on interest 
groups and their influence on foreign policy, another area to which this research is linked. The 
third and final section provides an overview of research on the relationship between federalism 
and foreign policy. 
 
 
127 Furtan and Gray, “The Constitutional Debate.” 
128 Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture,” 28.  
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 Domestic versus external sources of foreign policy 
 
 The determinants of foreign policy are the subject of an ongoing debate in the fields of 
international relations and foreign policy. There have been and still are important divisions 
among academics as whether foreign policy is predominantly determined by domestic or by 
external factors. 
 Classical realists conceive foreign policy as being determined by the international system. 
States only react to the actions of other states and to changes in the international system, and their 
foreign policy is determined by their position in the system. Domestic politics do not influence a 
country’s foreign policy; systemic factors predominate. Classic realism is the main theory which 
has dismissed domestic sources of foreign policy. Some classic realists have more recently 
integrated into their analysis the beliefs and preferences of the individuals and groups of people 
involved in the elaboration of foreign policy, while still putting the emphasis on external and 
systemic sources of foreign policy. Rose calls these theorists neoclassic realists129. Apart from 
classical realists, there is a wide consensus that foreign policy has domestic sources.  
 Theories and models acknowledging domestic factors as having an influence on foreign 
policy are numerous and diverse. Neo-liberal theorists of international relations were among the 
first to put an emphasis on domestic politics130, and the emergence and development of the 
subfield of foreign policy analysis was, according to Hill, the most important trigger in 
generating a wide acceptance of the existence of domestic sources of foreign policy131. Indeed, 
129 Rose, “Neoclassic Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” 
130 International Encyclopedia of Political Science, s.v. “foreign policy analysis.” 
131 Ibid. 
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 the idea that internal factors of a state influence its foreign policy is now widely accepted132. The 
debates now revolve less around whether or not foreign policy is determined by internal or 
external factors, but rather around the relative weight of each. There is an important body of work 
pertaining to domestic factors of foreign policy and the independent variables put forward by 
different research are varied. 
 Lawrence talks about three main approaches to domestic factors that influence foreign 
policy: organized interests, epistemic communities and public opinion133. The influence of 
organized interests on foreign policy was put forward by several neo-liberal theorists. For 
example Robert Keohane in Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy134, shows 
the influence of domestic interest groups on the United States’ foreign policy. Another example 
is Milner’s demonstration of how business associations and business corporations have 
influenced American foreign policy135. The concept of “epistemic communities” was developed 
in parallel to express the influence that experts such as academics and think tanks have on foreign 
policy136. There has also been extensive work on the influence of public opinion137.  
 Other domestic factors have been put forward. The field of foreign-policy decision-
making has focused on “human decisional behavior”138. This subfield of international relations 
has demonstrated the importance of leaders and the small groups of individuals involved in the 
132 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis; Putnam, “Diplomacy and Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 427. 
133 Jacobs and Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” 
134 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
135 Milner, Interets, Institutions, and Information. 
136 See for example Haas, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination; Hall, The Political Power of 
Economic Ideas; Nelkin, “Scientific Knowledge, Public Policy, and Democracy.” 
137 See for example Hartley and Russet, “Public Opinion and the Common Defense”; Holsti, The State, War, and the 
State of War; Nincic, “U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection.” 
138 Oxford Handbook of International Relations, s.v. “foreign-policy decision-making.” 
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 formulation of foreign policy. Stuart identifies Snyder, Bruck and Sapin139 as being the first to 
convincingly argue for “shifting the focus of IR research away from the reified nation state and 
toward those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state”140.  
 Finally, Foyle and Van Belle identified four main domestic sources of foreign policy141. 
Like Lawrence, they identify interest groups and public opinion. The third and fourth they 
underline are the media and elections. They specify there is still much controversy around the 
effect of public opinion and elections on foreign policy. For both, some scholars argue public 
opinion and elections do not affect the elaboration of foreign policy and some argue there is a 
direct effect. As for the media, Foyle and Van Belle claim Cohen142 was the first to illustrate the 
link between mass media and foreign policy. They view the media variable as being articulated 
around two poles in the literature: the media as an arena where views compete and the media as a 
catalyst for the formation of public opinion. The fourth main domestic source of foreign policy, 
according to Foyle and Van Belle, are interest groups. The next section will be dedicated to them.   
 
Interest groups and foreign policy 
 
 As was just illustrated, the relation between interest groups and foreign policy is a sub-
part of the broader literature on the domestic sources of foreign policy. It is here treated in a 
different section as the research will contribute to this broad literature and more specifically, to 
the literature on interest groups and foreign policy.  
139 Bruck and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making. 
140 Oxford Handbook of International Relations, s.v. “foreign-policy decision-making.” 
141 Foyle and Van Belle, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis.” 
142 Cohen, “Mass Communication and Foreign Policy.” 
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 The seminal work on the link between organized interests and foreign policy is 
Schattschneider’s Politics, Pressure and the Tariff143. He demonstrated the influence of business 
associations on US commercial foreign policy. “Subsequent research has broadened significantly 
the definition of ‘group’ to include not only business associations but various other types of 
nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy. Much of this literature reinforces 
Schattschneider’s original premise of the significant impact (real or anticipated) of organized 
groups upon the making of foreign policy144”.   
 The first important piece of work on the effect of interest groups on foreign policy 
therefore focused on trade policy and economic pressure groups. The contemporary literature on 
organized interests and foreign policy is in fact very much focused on the economic area of 
policy. Indeed, Foyle and Van Belle argue the main characteristic of the literature on interest 
groups and foreign policy is that it has remained very focused on two areas: the influence of 
ethnic lobbies on foreign policy and the influence of economic groups on trade policy. 
 Indeed, there has been a wide array of research done on the influence of ethnic lobbying 
on foreign policy. Like the literature on economic organized interests and trade policy, most of 
the literature has concentrated on the United States case145. The two cases that have been most 
analyzed in the United States are the Israel and Jewish lobby and the Cuban lobby146. Foyle and 
Van Belle explain that research on the Cuban lobby has been especially instructive in showing 
the importance of domestic politics for the formulation of foreign policy. They explain that the 
harsh American foreign policy toward Cuba cannot be explained by external factors. Cuba was 
143 Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. 
144 Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups. 
145 Foyle and Van Belle, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis.” 
146 See for example Ahrari, Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy; Ambrosio, Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. 
Foreign Policy; Smith, Foreign Attachments. 
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 not a powerful country economically or militarily. Its position in the international system did not 
justify the US embargo. The Cuban case allows the rare opportunity of clearly isolating the 
domestic variables, in this case the influence of the Cuban lobby in the US147.  
 The second focus of the literature on interest groups and foreign policy is the influence of 
economic organized interest on trade policy.  
One of the more unusual aspects of the domestic sources of foreign policy literature 
has to be the estrangement of the study of interest groups as a domestic source of 
foreign policy from the literature on interest groups and trade policy formation. 
Unlike the process and structural focus of the interest groups and foreign policy 
literature, the core of the trade policy research is built upon an economics and 
econometric approach to theory and research148. 
 
The part of the thesis research that puts forward the influence of agricultural interest groups on 
the Canadian government’s position is part of the literature relative to trade policy, as Canada’s 
position is a position on international agricultural trade. It is also noteworthy that the role of 
interest groups in the implementation of protectionist economic policies has been illustrated in 
several research studies149. As has been underlined by Foyle and Van Belle, the link between 
groups and trade policy has mostly been studied by economists and less so by political scientists. 
 
 
 
147 Haney and Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo. 
148 Foyle and Van Belle, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis.” 
149 See for example Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno, The State and American Foreign Policy; Nelson, “Endogenous 
Tariff Theory.” 
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 Federalism and foreign policy 
 
 This research will hopefully contribute to the literature on federalism and foreign policy 
as well. Federalism does appear to be a variable that has to be taken into account. For one, 
agriculture is a shared jurisdiction in Canada; both the federal government and the provincial 
governments intervene in the area of agricultural policy. Also, partly because agricultural 
production is regionally concentrated, tensions between sectors have led to tensions between 
provinces as well. Indeed, if an economic activity is regionally or provincially concentrated, 
chances of the interests of this sector being represented by regional or provincial governments are 
increased150. 
 If we turn to the broader literature on federalism and foreign policy, there remain 
important debates on the effects of the former on the latter. Simeon has argued that the federal 
system reduces the influence of interest groups on foreign policy, and policy in general151. 
Political authority is diffused in a federal system; interest groups are therefore unable to target a 
circumspect actor. Skogstad has argued for the opposite. According to her, the federal system 
rather offers more “access points” to interest groups152. They can target both federal and 
provincial ministries, bureaucrats and Cabinet members. These numerous entry points offer wider 
possibilities for the interest groups to influence policy. 
 Also focusing on the Canadian case, Kukucha claims provinces have become increasingly 
relevant in international trade153. The involvement of sub-federal governments in foreign policy 
has been studied on numerous occasions, but the effect of this involvement on the elaboration of 
150 Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada, 8-9. 
151 Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy,144. 
152 Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada, 159. 
153 Kukucha, The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy, 5. 
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 foreign policy by the federal government remains the subject of debate. Brown and Fry, as well 
as Nossal, have argued that the Canadian federal government remains in charge of foreign policy 
and that provincial activism has had little effect on it154. Skogstad on the other hand has 
illustrated that the Canadian federal government and the provincial governments have developed 
a mutual dependence relationship155. Kukucha underlines the same idea. He claims that as 
international agreements increasingly covered new policy areas that were under the jurisdiction 
of Canadian provinces, such as agriculture, energy and labour, the cooperation of provinces 
became more important and therefore their input was sought in accordance156. Still, he states that 
the autonomy and independence of the federal government in formulating foreign policies has not 
been diminished.  
 
Conclusion of the literature review 
   The position the Canadian government has held in the agricultural trade negotiations of 
the Uruguay and Doha rounds has not been the subject of much attention by political scientists. 
Still, Canadian agricultural policy has been studied by a few. Among other things, we should note 
that sectoral and territorial tensions divide the agricultural sector. Furthermore, agricultural 
interest groups, and more particularly farmers’ organizations, have had much influence in the 
agricultural policy space. Organizations from the supply-management sector have developed 
corporatist relationships with provincial governments, especially in Quebec and Ontario. All of 
the above are domestic factors, which seem to be the main factors looked at in the analysis of 
154 Brown and Fry, States and Provinces in the International Economy; Nossal, The Beijing Massacre. 
155 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture. 
156 Kukucha, The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy, 3. 
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 Canadian agricultural trade policy. Although classical realists dismissed domestic factors, there is 
a near-consensus among scholars of foreign policy and international relations that foreign policy 
has domestic sources and that domestic politics must be taken into account when trying to 
understand the origins of foreign policies. Among these domestic sources are domestic interest 
groups, which many scholars have seen as influencing the elaboration of foreign policy. This is 
particularly true for trade policy, the subject of this thesis. 
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 CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
This section provides a few pertinent explanations about the scope of the research, as well 
as a description of data collection.  
The supply management system governs five agricultural sectors in Canada: dairy, 
chicken, turkey, table eggs and hatching eggs. The research for this thesis has been limited to data 
on dairy, chicken and table-egg productions and organizations. This exclusion of the turkey and 
hatching-egg sectors made the research more manageable. And the small size of these sub-sectors 
helped justify not researching these sectors. The following table shows the number of members 
for each of the five supply-managed sectors’ national farmers’ organizations, for 2012. These 
numbers indicate the number of farmers for each of the five sectors and they show the turkey and 
hatching-egg industries are much smaller than the other three. Furthermore, the treatment of the 
supply-management system in the media and in academic research very often limits itself to 
dairy, chicken and table eggs. This is probably both because of the scale of the industries and for 
simplicity. Additionally, the term “egg” will refer to table eggs in the rest of this document, 
unless otherwise specified , for the sake of brevity. 
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Table 1. Number of members of the five national supply-
managed farmers’ organizations 
National organization Number of members 
Dairy Farmers of Canada 12 529 
Chicken Farmers of Canada 2 682 
Egg Farmers of Canada 1 016 
Turkey Farmers of Canada 531 
Canadian Hatching Egg Producers 300 
Source: “About Us,” Dairy Farmers of Canada, 
http://www.dairyfarmers.ca/who-we-are/about-us; “2012 
Annual Report,” Chicken Farmers of Canada, 
http://chickenfarmers.ca/upload/Documents/2012-annual-
report.pdf, 27; “Annual Report 2012,” Egg Farmers of 
Canada, http://eggfarmers.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/EFC_Annual_Report_2012_EN1.pd
f, 19;“ “Canadian Turkey Industry – 2012,” Turkey Farmers 
of Canada, 
http://www.turkeyfarmersofcanada.ca/industryStatistics/turke
yIndustry/; “About CHEP,” Canadian Hatching Eggs 
Producers, http://www.chep-poic.ca/about.html.  
 
 
 On a related subject, some provinces were also excluded from the study. The supply 
management system is pan-Canadian; it applies to the same five sectors in all provinces and 
territories. Yet, the study has concentrated on data from six provinces: Québec, Ontario, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. In comparison to these provinces, the 
Maritime provinces and the territories have marginal agricultural productions in general, and 
marginal productions in the supply-managed sectors in particular. The table below compiles the 
number of supply-managed farms in the ten provinces. As the table illustrates, the exception to 
this is Nova Scotia, which in fact has more supply-managed farms than Saskatchewan. But again, 
to render the research manageable, all four Maritime Provinces were excluded. Statistics Canada 
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 does not compile these data for territories and the national supply-managed agencies do not have 
the equivalent of provincial marketing boards for the territories, except the Egg Farmers of 
Canada, the Canadian egg marketing agency, of which a Northwest Territories producers’ board 
is a member157.  
 
Table 2. Number of supply-managed farms by province for 2011 
 Dairy Chicken Eggs (table and hatching) 
British Columbia 587 326 708 
Alberta 485 162 128 
Saskatchewan 141 61 40 
Manitoba 333 94 115 
Ontario 4 036 816 566 
Quebec 5915 398 164 
New Brunswick 228 11 33 
Nova Scotia 257 77 57 
Prince Edward Island 189 8 7 
Newfoundland and Labrador 36 7 12 
Canada 12 207 1 960 1 830 
Source: “Census of Agriculture, farms classified by the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), Canada and provinces, 2011,” Statistics Canada, 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a47. 
 
 The discrepancies between the numbers in the two previous tables can be explained in 
several ways. First of all, the first table compiles numbers for 2012 while the second compiles 
2011 numbers. Additionally, the first table reflects the number of members while the second has 
the number of farms. The number of members is often higher because there may be more than 
one farmer per farm. Several farms are owned by at least two agricultural producers (husband and 
wife, father and son, two business partners, etc.). 
157 “Partners – Egg Boards,” Egg Farmers of Canada, accessed July 13, 2013, http://eggfarmers.ca/our-
industry/partners/. 
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 An important component of the data collection has been a survey, sent by mail to 
approximately forty farmers’ organizations, from both the supply-management and the export-
dependent sectors (see Appendix B). The range of subjects on which the organizations were 
surveyed was quite large (see survey in Appendix C), but they were based on the criteria 
elaborated by Coleman in his work about policy advocacy and policy participation of interest 
groups. 
First, the questionnaires surveyed organizations on their resources in order to compare the 
capacities of organizations. Organizations were asked to provide information such as their annual 
budget, number of employees and number of members. Organizations were asked to provide 
numbers for 2012 because it is the year for which they were most likely to provide precise 
answers. Many of these organizations are very small and only have a handful of employees; it is 
therefore doubtful that they have recorded numbers since the 1980s. Still, since the Canadian 
government’s position was first elaborated in the mid-1980s, it would have been more interesting 
to compare data for the last thirty years and see if there have been important variations.  
Second, the questionnaires surveyed organizations about the nature of the relationships 
they have developed with the federal and provincial governments. The goal of the questions was 
to evaluate the degree of collaboration with government and to identify the ministries they 
interact most with.  
Third and last, the surveys aimed at characterizing the nature of the relationships 
organizations have developed among themselves, both between farmers’ organizations, as well as 
assessing the organization’s view on Canada’s position. Surveys were sent to the presidents of or 
executive directors of each organization and follow-up was done by phone and by email. The 
expected response rate was 25 per cent. The observed response rate was about 33 per cent.  
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 The surveys provided interesting data, but extensive additional research had to be done to 
complement it. First of all, basic data on the economic importance of each sector (cereals, 
oilseeds, beef, pork, eggs, poultry and dairy) and the distribution of each production over the 
country were collected. Second, data were compiled by surveying publications of the farmers’ 
organizations, such as their annual reports and policy papers. Third, there was a willingness to 
collect data by riding on the number of farmers and processing industries as well as the 
distribution over the provincial territories, in order to evaluate the electoral importance of the 
supply-management issue in Quebec and Ontario. Public databases did not fully provide these 
data and therefore approximate data were compiled from a study by the University of Calgary. 
Finally, a database of press articles from major Canadian anglophone newspapers mentioning 
“supply management”, from 1980 to 2013, was built. A total of 164 articles were collected, based 
on relevancy, out of the 964 articles in the Lexis-Nexis Academic database. The articles were in 
turn surveyed to compile statements by politicians, arguments by journalists and political analysts 
and additional facts on Canadian supply management. Interviews conducted with farmers’ 
organizations and government officials would have been an excellent source of information but 
the time, expertise and financial requirements for this enterprise are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
Finally, although the Uruguay Round took place from 1986 to 1994 and the Doha Round 
started in 2001, a majority of the statistics presented are from the 2000s and 2010s. Often 
numbers for the 1980s and 1990s were not available. At times it would have been more accurate 
to present statistics from those decades. But although there is at times a lack of synchronicity 
between the negotiation periods and the years of the data, statistics illustrate ideas when put 
against each other. For example, there are no numbers for the scale of the processing industry for 
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 each of the supply-managed sectors for the 1980s and 1990s. Still, the numbers for 2012 give us 
an idea of the scale of the industries and of their relative size to one another. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS – THE PREPONDERANT INFLUENCE OF THE FARMERS’ 
ORGANIZATIONS FROM THE SUPPLY-MANAGED SECTORS 
 
 Farmers’ organizations have had noticeable influence in the elaboration and 
implementation of agricultural policy in Western countries since the end of World War II158. 
Research has demonstrated that this observation includes Canada, where interest groups have 
been major players in the elaboration of agricultural policy159. And among interest groups, groups 
formed by agricultural producers were the main actors to influence policy until the 1980s160. 
During the 1980s, the Canadian government wanted to include a wider range of players in the 
development of agricultural policy, and processors have since emerged as important actors as 
well161. Of the numerous Canadian farmers’ organizations, those from the supply-managed 
sectors appear to stand out in terms of lobbying power. 
 Indeed, the preponderant influence of farmers’ organizations from the supply-managed 
sectors appears to be one of the main explanations in the continuous defence of the supply 
management system by the federal government in the Uruguay and Doha rounds of negotiations.  
They have a level of organizational capacities unparalleled by farmers’ organizations from other 
sectors such as cattle, hog and grains. The farmers from the dairy, poultry and egg industries are 
represented by the organizations that have the highest budgets, number of employees and 
publicity expenses. They are more cohesive and vertically integrated. They have developed 
strong coalitions in support of supply management, provincially and nationally. Farmers’ 
158 Halpin, Surviving Global Change?. 
159 See Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada, “The Uphill Struggle to Prevail”, 
Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture; Schmitz et al., Agricultural Policy, Agribusiness, and Rent-Seeking 
Behaviour. 
160 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 150;159. 
161 Ibid. 
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 organizations from the supply-managed sectors have therefore been able to effectively lobby the 
Canadian government.    
The influence of Canadian farmers’ organizations on agricultural trade negotiations 
outcomes has been underlined in previous research. Skogstad mentions the Canadian Federation 
of Agriculture (CFA) and the Union des producteurs agricoles (UPA) from Quebec convinced the 
Canadian government to defend supply management during the Uruguay Round162. In previous 
work, Skogstad points to the influence of farmers’ organizations from the supply-managed 
sectors during the negotiations that led to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. 
Despite strong pressure from the United States to dismantle supply management and therefore 
allow unrestricted American imports of dairy, eggs and poultry, the Canadian government 
refused to even put supply management on the negotiation table. Skogstad attributes this decision 
to the sway of supply-managed groups163.  
 The Canadian media have also depicted the supply-management organizations as highly 
influential. The following quotes illustrate this point: 
The worst offenders against reform were the perennial ones: Japan, Korea, the big 
producers in the European Union (notably France), the United States and Canada. 
Politicians in all these countries are scared stiff by their farm lobbies, in Canada’s 
case by the supply managed farmers concentrated in Ontario and Quebec164. (Globe 
and Mail, 2006) 
 
Parliament Hill is alive these days with lobbyists for the supply-managed farmers, 
the most powerful lobby group in Canada. They see potential threats to their cozy 
arrangements, and are mobilizing against the [CETA and TPP trade agreements]165. 
(Globe and Mail, 2011) 
 
162 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 153. 
163 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interets and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 341-342. 
164 Simpson, “Fear Trumps Reason in the Politics of Agriculture.” 
165 Simpson, “It Hurts Dancing to Supply Management’s Tune.” 
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 At [meetings for international trade negotiations], lobbyists for supply management 
always swarm the Canadian negotiating team166.  
(Globe and Mail, 2012) 
 
L’UPA […] is arguably the most powerful lobby group in Canada, along with the 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers167. (Globe and Mail, 2012) 
 
 
 Although these press comments are meager, they show some political observers feel 
supply-management organizations have a lot of influence on governmental decision-makers. It 
must be pointed out though that the quotes all come from the same columnist, Jeffrey Simpson 
from the Globe and Mail, and have been published between 2006 and 2012. Similar quotes are 
not present in articles that mention supply management in the Globe and Mail, the Financial 
Post/National Post, the Gazette or the Toronto Star for the years 1980 to 2005. This observation 
does not indicate that political observers thought otherwise, but it does tell us that these quotes 
only give us minimal insight; no pattern is observed in the media for the last forty years. 
 
Organizational capacities 
 
 The preponderant lobbying power of the supply-managed organizations can in part be 
explained by their important organizational capacities. In comparison to export-dependent 
farmers’ organizations, supply-managed farmers’ organizations have on average much more 
resources for the number of members they count.  
 The literature on interest groups brings forward some characteristics of groups that make 
them more influential. Among these are the number of members, the proportion of the sector that 
166 Simpson, “Don’t Touch the Milk and Eggs.” 
167 Ibid. 
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 is represented, the number of staff, and the budget. A large membership will give more 
legitimacy of representation. If an organization represents a very high proportion of the farmers 
in a given sector, this also increases its legitimacy and influence as the organization is the sole 
voice for the sector. The number of permanent employees is also an indicator of the influence an 
organization can have. If it has more employees, an organization has more resources to exercise 
pressure on government and to develop an expertise. The budget also impacts the influence the 
organization has. The bigger the budget, the more influence an organization can have. If it has 
important financial resources, an organization can initiate publicity campaigns, hire more 
employees who in turn can do research, hire a lobbyist, etc.  
 In terms of number of members, export-dependent farmers’ organizations have a much 
larger membership (see Appendix D). This is clear if we compare the membership numbers of the 
three major supply-managed national organizations (Dairy Farmers of Canada, Chicken Farmers 
of Canada and Egg Farmers of Canada) to those of two major export-dependent national 
organizations (Canadian Cattlemen’s Association and Grain Growers of Canada).  
 
Table 3. Number of individual members of the main national supply-
managed and export-dependent farmers’ organizations 
Organization Number of individual members 
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association 63 500 
Grain Growers of Canada 60 000 
Dairy Farmers of Canada 12 500 
Chicken Farmers of Canada 2 700 
Egg Farmers of Canada 1000 
Source: Data compiled from websites of organizations, except Grain 
Growers of Canada, where data came from the survey. 
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  Yet, despite the much higher number of individual members of the export-dependent 
organizations, the number of employees and the annual expenditure budget of the supply-
managed organizations are much higher (see  Appendix E and F). The farmers’ organization with 
the highest budget is the Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec, whose 2011 expenditure 
budget was $53 million168. The organization which comes second is the Egg Farmers of Canada, 
with a 2012 budget of $22 million169. The budget of the Dairy Farmers of Canada is unknown, 
but could be expected to be higher than at least the Egg Farmers of Canada. The Chicken Farmers 
of Canada’s budget in 2012 was $7.2 million170. In comparison, even though their membership is 
several times higher, the budget of the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association was $3.6 million in 
2012171, the Canadian Pork Council’s was $3 million in 2012172 and the Grain Growers’ was 
even lower173. The budget of the three latter organizations was lower than that of many provincial 
supply-managed organizations, including organizations such as les Éleveurs de volailles du 
Québec, Alberta Milk and Sask Milk, which respectively count 800, 600 and 170 members174. 
Supply-managed organizations therefore appear to have budgetary resources that are much more 
important than those of export-dependent organizations. Absolute numbers show this difference, 
but when set against the number of members organizations have, the contrast is much more 
accentuated. And high budgets allow organizations to fund activities such as publicity. For 
example, the Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec spent $15 million on advertising 
168 “Annual Report 2011,” Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec, accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://www.lait.org/fichiers/RapportAnnuel/?id=FPLQ-2011, p. 58. 
169 “Annual Report 2012,” Egg Farmers of Canada, accessed July 11, 2013, http://eggfarmers.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/EFC_Annual_Report_2012_EN1.pdf, p. 32. 
170 “Annual Report 2012,” Chicken Farmers of Canada, accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://chickenfarmers.ca/upload/Documents/2012-annual-report.pdf, p.44. 
171 “Annual Report 2012,” Alberta Beef Producers, accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://www.albertabeef.org/images/AnnualReports/AR11s.pdf, 47. 
172 “Annual Report 2012,” Canadian Pork Council, accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://www.ontariopork.on.ca/Portals/0/Docs/About/PorkOrg/CPC_annual_report.PDF, p.6. 
173 Data compiled from surveys. 
174 Ibid. 
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 campaigns in 2012175. The Egg Farmers of Canada, a much smaller organization in terms of 
membership spent $8 million on promotion and advertising campaigns that same year176, several 
times more than the overall budgets of the Canadian Cattlemen, the Pork Council and the Grain 
Growers.      
 In terms of staff numbers, similar differences can be observed between the supply-
managed and export-dependent organizations (see Appendix F). The farmers’ organization with 
the most permanent employees is the Dairy Farmers of Ontario with 75177. Out of the ten 
organizations that have the highest budgets, eight are supply-managed. The two other 
organizations are the organizations that represent the hog and cattle farmers of Quebec. Although 
they seem to contradict the trend that the more heavily staffed organizations are supply-managed, 
they do show that farmers’ organizations in Quebec, regardless of supply management, are 
resourceful organizations.  
 Finally, in terms of the proportion of farmers that is represented by the organizations in a 
given sector is usually higher among supply-managed organizations, although not consistently. 
While all of the supply-managed organizations that answered the survey indicated they 
represented between 91 and 100 per cent of the potential farmers they could represent, some of 
the non-supply-managed organizations that answered the survey indicated 91 to 100 per cent 
while others indicated 61 to 70 per cent. 
 
175 “Annual Report 2011,” Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec, accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://www.lait.org/fichiers/RapportAnnuel/?id=FPLQ-2011, p. 58. 
176 “Annual Report 2012,” Egg Farmers of Canada, accessed July 11, 2013, http://eggfarmers.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/EFC_Annual_Report_2012_EN1.pdf, p. 32. 
177 “2012 Annual Report,” Dairy Farmers of Ontario, accessed July 10, 2013, 
http://www.milk.org/Corporate/pdf/Publications-AnnualReport.pdf, p.37. 
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 Coordination and collaboration 
 
 Other distinctive features of the supply-management organizations that impact the degree 
of influence they have on government policies are the level of coordination and collaboration 
between them. As explained before, the supply management system is built around national 
agencies and provincial marketing boards. In most provinces and sectors, the farmers’ 
organization includes the role of marketing board. For example, the Dairy Farmers of Ontario 
acts as marketing board. In contrast, in British Columbia there is the BC Chicken Growers’ 
Association, who represents chicken farmers in the province, and there is in parallel a BC 
Chicken Marketing Board. Between the different organizations in the structure there is deep 
cooperation and integration. More precisely, there is a high level of collaboration between the 
national agency and the provincial marketing boards in a given sector, between the different 
provincial boards in a given sector, between supply-management provincial boards of a given 
province and between supply-management national agencies.  
 The survey responses indicate that for provincial supply management farmers’ 
organizations, their corresponding national agency is always listed as the organization with which 
they collaborate most (ie. Chicken Farmers of Canada for the provincial chicken organizations). 
A vast majority of them listed the other supply-managed provincial organizations as the 
organizations they second most frequently collaborate with. In the other cases, the organizations 
indicated that the other provincial marketing boards in their sector (to be clear, the same sector, 
but in other provinces) were the ones with which they second most collaborated with.  
It should be added here that the boards of directors of the national agencies are mostly 
made up of provincial representatives, issued from the executive committees or boards of 
58 
 
 directors of the different provincial boards. For example, the 2012-2013 board of directors of the 
Chicken Farmers of Canada is made up of 14 members. Four of these members are 
representatives of the poultry processing industry and of the restaurant and foodservices industry. 
The other ten members are representatives from each of the ten provinces; one member of each 
provincial board of directors. The provincial board members are farmers, usually elected by 
region by the members of the organization. The Dairy Farmers of Canada’s and the Egg Farmers 
of Canada’s boards of directors are composed in a similar way, although not exactly the same. 
Their boards of directors are also mainly formed by provincial boards of directors’ 
representatives. These details illustrate how intertwined the national agencies and the provincial 
boards are. They have separate staff, but their boards of directors overlap, assuring some direct 
links between the organizations.  
The export-dependent sectors’ provincial farmers’ organizations were not all surveyed 
and therefore it is not possible to compare their responses to those of the organizations from the 
supply-managed sectors. The hog and cattle organizations of Ontario and Quebec were the only 
ones surveyed and their answers provide very interesting insight into the level of collaboration of 
farmers’ organizations in Quebec. The Quebec cattle association, the Fédération des producteurs 
de bovins du Québec, is the only provincial cattle organization that is not part of the Canadian 
Cattlemen’s Association (CCA), which represents Canadian cattle farmers. This anomaly is what 
originally motivated the inclusion of the Quebec cattle organization in the surveying process. The 
Fédération des producteurs de bovins du Québec (FPBQ), unlike the Canadian Cattlemen’s 
Association, is supportive of the supply management system. The CCA is a member of the 
Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance (CAFTA – see list of members in Appendix G), a coalition 
that groups farmers’ organizations and processing-industry associations from the export-
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 dependent sector. . It advocates for free trade in agricultural trade. Although CAFTA remains 
neutral on supply management178, several of its members are against the system, stating among 
other things that the defense of supply management by the Canadian government in international 
trade negotiations undermines Canada’s position and threatens an increased access to foreign 
markets179. CAFTA was formed in 2001 to represent the sectors that are export-dependent and to 
be an alternative voice for the farmers of Canada, whose only voice at multilateral trade 
negotiations was the Canadian Federation of Agriculture before that180. 
Half of the supply-management organizations surveyed indicated CAFTA as the only 
organization it feels in competition with in trying to influence government for agricultural trade 
negotiations. The remaining half stated they did not feel they were in competition with any 
organization. To another question on whether or not they agree with the position Canada has been 
holding in the Uruguay and Doha rounds, those latter organizations in general said they did agree 
with Canada’s position, explaining it was a ‘balanced’ position that could meet the interests of all 
agricultural sectors. In other words, the organizations that said they did not feel they were in 
competition with another organization also characterized Canada’s position as one satisfying all 
parties. 
Only about 30 per cent of Quebec’s beef  production was exported abroad in 2012181. In 
contrast, about 50 per cent of Canadian beef is exported182. Quebec cattle farmers do not depend 
as much on the opening of new markets as Prairie cattle farmers, who export nearly 80 per cent of 
178 “International Trade Committee on May 10th, 2012,” Open Parliament, accessed Julne 18, 2013, 
http://openparliament.ca/committees/international-trade/41-1/36/kathleen-sullivan-2/. 
179 Skogstad, “Federalism and Agricultural Marketing,” 91-92. 
180 Wilson, “Sectors oppose CFA trade position.” 
181 Allard, “D’où provident votre viande?” 
182 “Our Industry, ” Canada Beef, accessed July 5, 2013, 
http://www.canadabeef.ca/ca/en/beef_export/industry/importance.aspx. 
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 their production. But cattle farmers are not the only non-supply-managed producers who are 
favorable to supply management in Quebec.  
The GO5 Coalition was formed by the farmers’ organizations of the five supply-managed 
sectors in Quebec in 2003 with the sole purpose of advocating for the supply-management 
system. It has numerous supporters and among them are Quebec’s farmers’ organizations for 
cattle, cash crops, fruits and vegetables for processing, and large game. In Quebec, several sectors 
that are not supply-managed actually support the system. This analysis contributes to the 
conception of the UPA as a monolithic block, explaining part of its exceptional lobbying power. 
For one, UPA’s authority has been granted by government. In 1972, the Quebec 
government legally awarded UPA with a monopoly of representation of the province’s farmers. 
All of Quebec’s farmers have to pay a mandatory membership contribution to the organization, 
although they do not have to be ‘active members’. Furthermore, the level of vertical integration 
of the province’s various farmers’ organizations under the UPA seems unparalleled in other 
provinces. As UPA’s website outlines, “with its 155 basic unions, 16 regional federations, 222 
unions and 25 specialized groups, the UPA is actually the single mouthpiece, the official voice 
that speaks on behalf of all Quebec farmers”183. Farmers’ organizations in Quebec are all 
integrated into the UPA structure. All of Quebec’s specialized federations have offices in the 
same building, the ‘UPA House’. Over 500 people work in the same building, for farmers’ 
organizations.  
 
183 “Who We Are,” Union des Producteurs Agricoles, accessed July 13, 2013, 
http://www.upa.qc.ca/en/Who_we_are/Who_we_are.html. 
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Figure 1. Organization chart of the UPA. Figure 1.: “Organization Chart,” Union des Producteurs 
agricoles, http://www.upa.qc.ca/en/Who_we_are/Organigramme/Organigramme.html. 
 
In contrast to the supply-managed sector, particularly in Quebec and Ontario, the 
representation of farmers in export-dependent sectors in the Western provinces is more 
fragmented. This contrast has been underlined by Grace Skogstad184. For example, Alberta is the 
biggest player in cattle production, contributing 55 per cent to Canada’s cattle farm cash receipts 
in 2010. About 35 per cent of Alberta’s farm cash receipts were attributable to cattle production 
in 2010185. Five organizations represent the province’s cattle farmers. Representation is therefore 
not a monopoly. Alberta Beef Producers is the biggest of the five but its influence is diluted by 
184 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 330. 
185 Data compiled from “Farm Cash Receipts,” Statistics Canada, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-011-x/21-011-
x2011002-eng.pdf; “Farm Cash Receipts 1970-1980,” Statistics Canada, Farm Cash Receipts_1970-1980.xlsx. 
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 the fact that the provincial government also takes into account the interests of the other four 
organizations.  
The only major Quebec sectoral farmers’ organization that is not a member of the GO5 
coalition is the Fédération des producteurs de porcs du Québec (FPPQ, hog producers). As the 
following graph shows, hog production is the second most important in the province in terms of 
farm cash receipts, after dairy. 
Table 4. Percentage of Quebec’s total farm cash receipts by production type, 1970-2010  
 
Source: Data compiled from “Farm Cash Receipts,” Statistics Canada, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-011-x/21-011-x2011002-eng.pdf; “Farm Cash 
Receipts 1970-1980,” Statistics Canada, Farm Cash Receipts_1970-1980.xlsx. 
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 In contrast to beef, over 60 per cent of the pork Quebec produces is exported abroad186. In 
comparison, about 50 per cent of Canada’s pork production is exported187. Quebec’s hog farmers 
are therefore much more dependent on gaining access to foreign markets than cattle farmers. 
Quebec’s hog producers appear to be the only important producers’ federation not to support 
supply management and to be the exception to the pro-supply management Quebec block, under 
the umbrella of UPA. 
 Finally, the cohesion of the supply-managed organizations can also be seen in the 
coalitions they have formed in relation to the issue of agricultural trade. In reaction to the 
launching of the Doha round of negotiations on agriculture, Canadian supply-managed 
organizations formed coalitions to lobby for their interests as a bloc. Quebec’s five provincial 
supply-managed organizations formed the GO5 Coalition, FarmGate5 was formed in Ontario, 
and BCSM 5 was formed in BC. The two most active have been GO5 and FarmGate5. GO5 has 
garnered the support of 52 organizations, 141 Quebec municipalities, 21 prominent people, 17 
members of the provincial National Assembly, and 3 members of the federal Parliament188. 
FarmGate5’s website only lists some of its most important supporters. Among them are the 
Ontario Federation of Agriculture; the leaders of the provincial Liberal party, the provincial 
Progressive Conservative Party and the provincial New Democratic Party; 12 municipalities or 
counties; 20 members of the federal Parliament; and 100 members of the provincial 
Parliament189. It also has the support of the Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario, the second 
186 Gougeon, “Portrait des marchés d’exportation du porc québécois,” Porc Québec, accessed July 12, 2013, 
http://www.agrireseau.qc.ca/porc/documents/PQ%20mars%202012%20%c3%89conomie.pdf. 
187 “Canadian Pork Exports,” Canada Pork International, accessed July 12, 2013, 
http://www.canadapork.com/fr/information-sur-l-industrie/exportations-canadiennes-de-porc. 
188 “About GO5 – Our supporters,” GO5 Coalition, accessed July 12, 2013, http://www.go5quebec.ca/en/appuis.php. 
189 “Partial List of Supporters,” FarmGate5, accessed July 12, 2013, http://www.farmgate5.org/PDF/farmgate-
supporters_list.pdf. 
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 most important general provincial farmers’ organization in Ontario after the Ontario Federation 
of Agriculture. It must be acknowledged that in parallel, the export-dependent sectors have also 
formed an active and influential coalition, the Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance. It is therefore 
not only the supply-managed organizations which have been effective at coordinating their 
lobbying efforts, but the formation of the supply-managed coalitions contributes to showing the 
many ways in which these organizations collaborate on a permanent basis. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS – SUPPLY MANAGEMENT, FOREMOST AN INTEREST OF 
QUEBEC AND ONTARIO 
 
 The second main reason for the continued support to supply management by the Canadian 
government is that the system is foremost in the interest of Ontario and Quebec. Indeed, supply-
managed farms are heavily concentrated in the Central provinces. This concentration has led the 
influential provincial governments of Quebec and Ontario to be strong advocates of supply 
management, both on the national and on the international scenes. Additionally, electoral reasons 
have also motivated the support of the system by all major national political parties. Furthermore, 
the Bloc Québécois has become an ardent defender of the system and the federal government has 
also maintained the status quo in order not to heighten Québec nationalism and separatism, at a 
time when Canada was shaken by national disunity. Finally, supply-management farmers’ 
organizations have been able to influence government effectively because of the corporatist 
relationships they have developed with the federal and provincial governments, especially in 
Quebec and Ontario. Producers have garnered the support of part of the processing industry. 
Processors are divided on the issue of supply management, but several of the most important 
Canadian processors are supportive of the system. Important financial institutions have also 
supported the system, valuing the stability offered by the supply-managed industries.   
 
Concentration of supply management in Quebec and Ontario 
 
 As mentioned previously in the thesis, the Canadian agricultural sector can roughly be 
divided into two sub-sectors: the supply-management sector which includes dairy, poultry and 
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 eggs and the export-dependent sector which includes cattle, hog, grains and oilseeds. Although 
these different productions are found in every province, they are regionally concentrated. Most of 
the supply-management productions are in central Canada whereas most of the export-dependent 
productions are concentrated in the Prairies. The following map from Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada partially shows the distribution of agriculture production over the country’s territory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Most important agricultural productions for each province.Figure 2. 
Source: “Where’s Ag At,” Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-
afficher.do?id=1251899760841&lang=eng. 
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 Yet, because the map is organized by top commodities by province and territory, it does 
not show that poultry and egg productions are concentrated in Quebec and Ontario. The 
following figures illustrate the concentration of supply-management productions in those two 
provinces. Farm cash receipts express the value of the production; they are the equivalent of an 
agricultural gross domestic product. The following graphs show that in 2010, approximately 70 
per cent of dairy farm cash receipts were provided by productions in Quebec and Ontario; 60 per 
cent in poultry and 55 per cent in eggs. And this concentration of supply-managed production in 
those two provinces has been very stable for the last 40 years.  
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 Table 5. Percentage of Canadian dairy farm cash receipts by province, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Data compiled from “Farm Cash Receipts,” Statistics Canada, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-011-x/21-011-x2011002-eng.pdf; “Farm Cash Receipts 
1970-1980,” Statistics Canada, Farm Cash Receipts_1970-1980.xlsx. 
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 Table 6. Percentage of Canadian dairy farm cash receipts by province, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Data compiled from “Farm Cash Receipts,” Statistics Canada, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-011-x/21-011-x2011002-eng.pdf; “Farm cash 
receipts 1970-1980,” Statistics Canada, Farm Cash Receipts_1970-1980.xlsx. 
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Table 7. Percentage of Canadian egg farm cash receipts by province, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Data compiled from “Farm Cash Receipts,” Statistics Canada, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-011-x/21-011-x2011002-eng.pdf; “Farm cash 
receipts 1970-1980,” Statistics Canada, Farm Cash Receipts_1970-1980.xlsx. 
 
The assessment of the concentration of supply-managed productions in central Canada is 
also confirmed by other numbers. For dairy, Quebec and Ontario account for 82 per cent of 
farms190, 70 per cent of production measured in hectolitres191 and 76 per cent of the National 
190 “Number of Farms With Shipments of Milk or Cream on August 1st,” Canadian Dairy Information Center, 
Accessed June 25, 2013, http://dairyinfo.gc.ca/pdf/farms_shipping_milk.pdf. 
191 “Milk Production at the Farm –Canada,” Canadian Dairy Information Center, accessed June 25, 2013,  
http://www.dairyinfo.gc.ca/pdf/farmprod.pdf. 
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 Market Sharing Quota192. In poultry, 67 per cent of farms193 and 60 per cent of production in 
terms of thousands of kilograms of chicken194are in central Canada. For eggs, 43 per cent of 
producers195, 57 per cent of production in dozens196 and 56 per cent of the quota197 were from 
central Canada. Overall, Quebec and Ontario have 74 per cent of supply management farms198. 
Although the numbers show varying levels of concentration, they demonstrate that supply 
management productions are overwhelmingly centered in Quebec and Ontario. Furthermore, 
supply management represents a large proportion of each province’s agricultural sector. As the 
following graphs show, about 40 per cent of Quebec’s farm cash receipts come from supply-
managed productions, with 30 per cent of total farm cash receipts coming from dairy production 
alone. About 28 per cent of Ontario’s farm cash receipts came from supply-managed sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
192 “Market Sharing Quota,” Canadian Dairy Commission, accessed June 25, 2013, http://www.cdc-
ccl.gc.ca/CDC/index-eng.php?id=3807. 
193 “2012 Annual Report,” Chicken Farmers of Canada, accessed August 10, 2013, 
http://chickenfarmers.ca/upload/Documents/2012-annual-report.pdf, 26-27. 
194 “Annual Report 2012,” Chicken Farmers of Canada, 18. 
195 “Annual Report 2012,” Egg Farmers of Canada, 19. 
196 “Canada’s Poultry and Egg Industry 2004,” National Farm Products Council, accessed June 27, 2013, 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/A99-2-1-2004E.pdf, 38. 
197 “Annual Report 2012,” Egg Farmers of Canada, 20. 
198 “Farms, by farm type and province,” Statistics Canada, accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/agrc35a-eng.htm. 
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 Table 8. Percentage of Quebec’s total farm cash receipts by production type, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Data compiled from “Farm Cash Receipts,” Statistics Canada, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-011-x/21-011-x2011002-eng.pdf; “Farm cash 
receipts 1970-1980,” Statistics Canada, Farm Cash Receipts_1970-1980.xlsx. 
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 Table 9. Percentage of Quebec’s total farm cash receipts by production type, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Data compiled from “Farm Cash Receipts,” Statistics Canada, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-011-x/21-011-x2011002-eng.pdf; “Farm cash 
receipts 1970-1980,” Statistics Canada, Farm Cash Receipts_1970-1980.xlsx. 
 
In comparison, supply management productions account for 10 per cent of Manitoba’s 
farm cash receipts, 3 per cent of Saskatchewan’s, and 8.5 per cent of Alberta’s (see Appendix H). 
British Columbia is somewhat of an exception. About 37.5 per cent of the province’s farm cash 
receipts come from supply-managed productions – more than in Ontario – but when looking at 
which provinces are most important for each production (graphs 1, 2 and 3), it becomes apparent 
that Ontario and Quebec stand alone. The maintenance of the system is therefore foremost an 
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 interest for these two provinces. And in turn the provincial governments of Quebec and Ontario 
have become strong advocates of supply management199. 
 Skogstad put forward that the concentration of an economic activity in a province or 
region raises the chances that interests from this economic sector influences a provincial 
government. She opposes another idea though: if an economic activity is concentrated in one 
province, it does not constitute an important activity for the Canadian federation as a whole. The 
federal government will therefore not view this economic activity as a priority200. Supply-
management is regionally concentrated, but the provinces it is overly present in are Quebec and 
Ontario, provinces that have been said to have an upper hand in federal politics.  
It has been argued and demonstrated that their interests prevail to the detriment of the 
interests of Western and Atlantic Provinces. This situation has fuelled considerable discontent 
among “peripheral” provinces, particularly in the West201. One of the most cited examples to 
illustrate this trend is the National Energy Program introduced by Pierre E. Trudeau in 1981. The 
ascendancy of Central Canada is explained by its electoral, demographic, economic and historical 
importance. Together, the two provinces elect 181 of the 308 House of Commons seats (59 per 
cent). The population of both provinces is 62 per cent of Canada’s202 and their combined share of 
the national GDP is 57 per cent203. Furthermore, the two provinces are part of the four founding 
provinces of Canada. 
199 Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs and Paradigms,” 504. 
200 Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada, 8-9. 
201 Braid and Sharpe, Breakup: Why the West Feels Left Out of Canada; Kilgour, Inside Outer Canada. 
202 “Population by year, by province and territory,” Statistics Canada, accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm. 
203 “Gross domestic product, expenditure-based, by province and territory,” Statistics Canada, accessed May 16, 
2012, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/econ15-eng.htm. 
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 It has indeed been suggested by several authors that supply management has continued to 
be defended domestically and internationally because it is concentrated in central Canada. Cooper 
underlined that Conservative MPs from Ontario and Quebec and Prime Minister Mulroney, 
during the Uruguay Round, were very concerned about the potential impact of the WTO 
agreement on the livelihoods of supply management farmers in these two provinces204. Skogstad 
also claims that “federal parties and parliamentarians of all stripes have been cognizant of the 
political power of supply management in central Canada :in part a result of swing rural votes in 
large provinces such as Ontario and Quebec, but also in large part a function of the organizational 
strength and coherence of the supply management lobby”205.  
 
Support from the governments of Quebec and Ontario  
 
In any case, Quebec’s and Ontario’s provincial governments have been strong defenders 
of supply management, both nationally and internationally. Quebec’s successive governments 
have publicly asked the federal government to promise to defend supply management. In 2007, 
Quebec’s agricultural minister, Laurent Lessard, held a joint press conference with the president 
of the Union des producteurs agricoles, Laurent Pellerin, to state that a Doha-round agreement 
would have to allow supply management206. In the context of talks for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, Jean Charest, Quebec’s Prime minister between 2003 and 2012, said in 2011 that 
supply management was non-negotiable207. Pauline Marois, Quebec’s current Prime minister, 
204 Cooper, In Between Countries. 
205 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 143. 
206 Le Devoir, “La fin de la gestion de l’offre nuirait aux productions agricoles québécoises. ” 
207 Les Affaires, “Gestion de l’offre : ‘non négociable’, dit Charest.” 
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 elected in 2012, assured her support to supply management at the annual assemble of the UPA in 
December 2012208. In January 2013, she also said, in relation to the negotiations for a free trade 
agreement with the European Union, that supply management had to be secured; her agricultural 
minister added that Quebec could otherwise consider not applying certain clauses of the 
agreement in the province209.  
Ontario’s premiers and agricultural ministers have also been active in supporting supply 
management. For example, at the beginning of the trade talks for the Uruguay Round, Ontario’s 
agriculture minister visited Washington with the purpose of advocating for supply-
management210. Another example occurred during the Doha round.  
Next week’s world trade talks in Hong Kong are too important to the province’s 
economy and its second largest industry to be missed, even if the negotiations 
seemed doomed to be failure, Ontario’s agriculture minister says. In fact, Leona 
Dombrowsky may spend more time in Hong Kong than the country’s chief 
negotiator. Her priority at the talks will be to ensure that the supply management 
systems governing egg, poultry and dairy industries do not become a bargaining chip 
in a scramble to reach a deal in Hong Kong211. 
 
The supply-managed sectors have not only garnered the support of Quebec City and Toronto. It 
seems that the system is supported by all provincial governments, although this support appears 
to be unstable at times. For example, a 1992 press article reports that provincial agriculture 
ministers pressed the federal government to increase its defence of supply management212. In 
2011, Canadian agriculture minister Gerry Ritz held a joint press conference with Alberta’s and 
208 Canoe.ca, “Pauline Marois prend des engagements.” 
209 Larivière, “Marois défend la gestion de l’offre à Londres. ” 
210 Mackie, “Minister to Ask U.S. Not to Fight Farm Policy.” 
211 Laidlaw, “Hong Kong Trade Talks Key.” 
212 McCarthy, “Minister Charges U.S. Out to Get Our Farmers.” 
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 Saskatchewan’s agriculture ministers. Among other subjects, the three of them affirmed their 
support to supply management213. Still, in the 1980s, Saskatchewan’s premier was against the 
defence of supply management in international trade negotiations214. And a 1989 Globe and Mail 
article states that the “Alberta Department of Agriculture likes the 1989 US plan to end import 
restrictions on agricultural commodities”215. Furthermore, provincial governments from the 
Prairies have also been advocates of other sectors. For example, “Prairie agriculture ministers 
will be in Hong Kong to advocate on the behalf of the Wheat Board, which will have its own 
representatives at the talks216.” Skogstad further claims that the unity that is observable on supply 
management in Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia and the Maritimes is not in the Prairies. She 
states that the governments of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba are favorable to the export-
dependent sector “who insist that the Canadian government abandons its balanced trade 
position”217. The divergence of interests between agricultural sectors has therefore to some 
degree, extended to a divergence of interests and tensions between provincial governments218.  
 
Corporatism in supply management in Quebec and Ontario 
 
 The strong advocacy position the governments of Quebec and Ontario have been taking 
with supply management is at least partly explained by the partnership relation these provincial 
governments have developed with farmers’ organizations, often described as a ‘corporatist’ 
relationship. As explained before, corporatism describes a relationship between interest groups 
213 O’Neil, “Minister Defends Quotas.” 
214 Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture,” 34. 
215 Globe and Mail, “U.S. Trade Plan Drives Wedge Between Farmers.” 
216 Laidlaw, “Hong Kong Trade Talks Key.” 
217 Skogstad, “Gestion de l’offre, fédéralisme canadien et négociations commerciales.”  
218 Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada, 8-9. 
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 and governments where they respectively view each other as partners. It is usually a tripartite 
relationship. In agricultural policy, the three actors are government, farmers’ organizations and 
processors219. Goodman and Redcliff talk about a ‘corporatist alliance’ whereas Skogstad rather 
talks about a ‘policy community’220. The relationship between provincial farmers’ organizations 
from the supply-managed sectors and the governments of Quebec and Ontario has been described 
as a corporatist one. In contrast, farmers’ organizations in other provinces and non-supply 
management groups in central Canada have pressure pluralist relations with government221.  
 The development of corporatist relationships could be explained by the structure of the 
supply-management system, which integrates government, producers, processors and, in some 
cases, consumers. The essential units of the system are the provincial marketing boards and the 
national marketing agencies. Their authority has been granted by government, which also 
governs them through the Farm Products Council of Canada (known before 2009 as the National 
Farm Products Council), a public oversight body. The boards of directors of the national agencies 
are formed of producers, processors and at times consumers. For example, the 2012-2013 board 
of directors of the Egg Farmers of Canada (EFC) is formed of 16 members. 12 members are 
farmers: the chairman of the EFC and eleven representatives of the marketing boards’ boards of 
directors (ten provinces and the Northwest Territories). The other four come from the industry: 
three from the Canadian Poultry and Egg Processors Council and one from the Consumers’ 
Association of Canada. The distribution of the EFC board of directors is built on the same pattern 
219 Goodman and Redcliff,  The International Farm Crisis,9; Lehmbruch, “Concertation and the Structure of 
Corporatist Networks,” 62. 
220 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture. 
221 Coleman and al., “Paradigm Shifts and Policy Networks,” 285-293. 
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 every year222. The institutions at the heart of the supply-management system therefore bring 
together producers and processors. Still, this structure is the same in all provinces and therefore 
this variable does not explain why the corporatist relationships are exclusive to Quebec and 
Ontario.  
Skogstad goes further into saying that there is a convergence of interests of government, 
producers, processors and consumers in the supply management system223. The convergence of 
the interests of involved actors is one of the features of the corporatist alliance224. Indeed, 
Skogstad reports that supply management is in the interest of the producers, who have stable 
revenues that generate profits; processors, who have a stable supply of primary products at a 
stable price; consumers, who can enjoy an offer of domestic and safe quality food; and 
government, which fulfills his goal of supporting agriculture and meets success with its policy. 
 
Support for supply management in the dairy and poultry processing industries 
 
 Yet, supply-management is an issue that deeply divides political analysts and academia. 
The multiple studies, reports and editorials published since the 1980s in Canada provide counter-
arguments to Skogstad’s argument that supply management is in all actors’ interest. On numerous 
occasions it has been claimed that because of supply management, consumers pay a much higher 
price for dairy, poultry and eggs than they would under free trade. It is also argued that supply 
management does not encourage productivity and producers who would normally go out of 
222 “People – Board of Directors,” Egg Farmers of Canada, accessed July 12, 2013, http://eggfarmers.ca/about-
us/people/. 
223 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 143. 
224 Von Beyme, “Neo-Corporatism: a New Nut in an Old Shell?,” 176. 
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 business remain. Others have criticized it for affecting Canada’s negotiating credibility and 
power in international trade negotiations. The Consumers Association of Canada and the 
Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association have been opposing supply management for 
decades now. In both cases, their main criticism is that prices are artificially raised and too 
high225. Furthermore, unlike what Skogstad claims, the processing industry also appears to be 
somewhat divided. In 2006, the Globe and Mail reported that: 
The Dairy Processors Association of Canada, which represents the companies that 
turn 90 per cent of the country’s milk into products, champions a more competitive 
marketplace…Mr. MacGillivray [chairman] confessed that [the Dairy Processor 
Association of Canada and the Dairy Farmers of Canada] could no longer work 
together. “We cannot innovate, grow and prosper by building more trade barriers,” he 
said. “Supply management isn’t working for us. We need growth.”226 
 
 Yet, in March 2013, the Dairy Processor Association of Canada made a submission to the 
Government of Canada where their position was more nuanced. It claims to not want the 
dismantlement of the supply management system, but its modernization. It sees value in the 
stability that supply management has brought, but it claims that it has prevented growth. It asks 
for a more flexible way of allocating production that can adapt to processors’ needs more 
effectively; lower prices that are determined by the market; a simplified, more “responsive” and 
more “transparent” system; and the possibility to export227. 
 On the other hand, the Canadian Poultry and Eggs Processors Council (CPEPC), which 
groups more than 90 per cent of the Canadian processors for chicken, turkey, table eggs and 
225 Drohan, “Canada, U.S. Begin Talks on Farm Product Tariffs.” 
226 Reynolds, “Stop Milking Outdated Agricultural Quotas.” 
227 “Submission to Government of Canada,” Dairy Processors Association of Canada, March 2013, accessed June 24, 
2013, http://www.dpac-atlc.ca/submissions/DPAC-ATLC%20Public%20Policy%20Document%20--
%20March%202013.pdf. 
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 hatching eggs, appears more favorable to supply management, although identifying negative 
issues such as the complexity of the regulatory regime and the high prices228. Very recently, the 
chief executive officer of the CPEPC testified at the House of Commons Agriculture and Agri-
Food Committee on animal welfare. He mentioned supply management as being an advantage for 
this issue: “the supply-managed nature of the poultry and egg industries in Canada helps facilitate 
our ability to manage this issue. It is a supply chain issue. Genetics companies, farmers, 
transporters, and processors all have a role to play229.”   
 
Table 10. Most important dairy processors in Canada in 2010 
Company 2010 Sales ($000) Ownership Major Shareholder 
Saputo Inc. 5,810,582 Public Gestion Jolina Inc. 
Agropur Co-operative 3,345,177 Co-operative 3,459 co-op members 
Nestlé Canada Inc. 2,600,000 Private subsidiary of 
public company 
Nestlé S.A. 
Parmalat Canada Inc. 2,200,000 Private Parmalat SpA 
Pineridge Group 480,000 Private  
Gay Lea Foods Co-
operative Ltd. 
441,856 Co-operative Dairy farmers in Ontario 
Scotsburn Co-
operative Services Ltd. 
282,000 Private Co-operative 
Amalgamated Dairies 
Ltd. 
133,000 Co-operative Co-op members 
Kawartha Dairy 
Limited 
33,000 Private Crowe family 
228 “Canadian Poultry and Egg Processors Council,” The Canadian Business Journal, accessed July 10, 2013, 
http://www.cbj.ca/associations/canadian_poultry_and_egg_processors_council.html.  
229 “Agriculture Committee on May 28th 2013,” Open Parliament, accessed July 15, 2013, 
http://openparliament.ca/committees/agriculture/41-1/83/k-robin-horel-1/.  
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 Organic Meadow Inc. 30,000 
(estimate) 
Private Organic Meadow farmers 
 
Source : “Top Players in the Canadian Dairy Processing Industry in 2010,” Canadian Dairy 
Commission, http://www.cdc-ccl.gc.ca/CDC/index-eng.php?id=3802. 
 
If we look at the top processors in poultry and dairy individually, they’ve also expressed 
support for supply management. In dairy, the two most important processors are Saputo and 
Agropur, both from Quebec. Saputo’s position on supply management is not publicly known, but 
the following quote leads to believe that the company is neutral or favorable to the system. 
“Canadian cheese maker Saputo Inc. chief executive Lino Saputo Jr. […] added the company 
would do fine even if the supply management system is dismantled.”230 In a 2009 interview, Lino 
Saputo said supply management encompassed advantages and disadvantages231. We could 
conclude the company at least appears to be neutral on the issue. Agropur on the other hand has 
publicly taken position in support of supply management. It is one of the official supporters of 
the GO5 coalition, which groups Quebec’s farmers’ organizations from the supply-managed 
sectors with the optic of lobbying for the maintenance of the system232. This is not surprising 
given that Agropur is a farmer-owned cooperative. The interests of dairy farmers and members of 
the processing firm therefore overlap.  
 
 
230 Gazette, “End Food Sector Protectionism.” 
231 Mesly, “Comment Saputo Gère 47 Usines sur 2 Continents.” 
232 “About GO5 – Our Supporters, ” GO5 Coalition, accessed June 20, 2013, 
http://www.go5quebec.ca/en/appuis.php. 
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 Table 11. Five largest primary poultry processing companies in Canada 
Company Province of origin Type of ownership 
Coopérative fédérée du Québec (Olymel)  Quebec Co-op (100 000 members) 
Lilydale Poultry Cooperative / Lilydale Inc. Ontario Co-op until 2005 
Maple Leaf Poultry Ontario Public 
Exceldor  Quebec Co-op (230 members) 
Maple Lodge Farms Ontario Private 
 
Source: “Poultry Facts,” Farm Credit Canada, June 2012, accessed August 5, 2013, 
http://www.fcc-fac.ca/en/learningcentre/knowledge/doc/Poultry_facts_e.pdf. 
 
 In the poultry processing industry, support for supply management is also observable. 
Except for Lilydale and Maple Lodge, whose positions are not publicly available, the other top 
three poultry processing firms have been supporters of supply management. La Coopérative 
fédérée has vocally supported the system. Like Agropur, it is an official supporter of the GO5 
coalition. In November 2012, a rally was organized in Quebec to express a joint support to supply 
management, in the context of the negotiations for the trade agreements with the European Union 
and with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It was also asked that “the Government comply with the 
unanimous motion voted by the House of Commons on November 22, 2005, in accordance with 
its commitment”233. The meeting was hosted by the Union des producteurs agricoles, the GO5 
Coalition and the Coopérative fédérée. It seems clear that the latter’s commitment to supply 
management is deep and favorable. 
 Exceldor and Maple Leaf have also explicitly said they want to maintain supply 
management. Quebec’s government had a public commission on agriculture between 2006 and 
233 “More than 400 Partners From the Fields of Agriculture Business and Civil Society Rally to Support Supply 
Management,” GO5 Coalition, November 11, 2012, accessed June 20, 2013, 
http://www.go5quebec.ca/en/communiques_111112.php. 
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 2008, the ‘Commission sur l’avenir de l’agriculture et de l’agroalimentaire québécoise’ 
(Commission on the future of Quebec’s agriculture and agri-food system). In 2007, Exceldor 
submitted a report to the Commission, in which it clearly states it wants the federal government 
to guarantee the survival of supply management in the current WTO negotiations234. It says a 
lowering of tariffs for poultry products would devastate their industry. It does recommend that 
the supply management system be modified in order to allow more decisional power to go to 
processors and for quota allotment to be more responsive to the interests of processors. But 
overall, it does not question supply management, “which has served well the general interests of 
the industry up to now”235. Again, this should come as no surprise as Exceldor is a cooperative 
owned by 230 poultry farmers236. 
 Insight into Maple Leaf’s stance on supply management is given through an interview 
with the company’s chief executive officer, Michael McCain, in 2003. Mr. McCain states that 
“he believes supply management should be supported. It is a system that can provide fair returns 
to all stakeholders provided it does its job”. He does add that the system has some flaws that 
should be addressed, but that the company is willing to work with the industry as a whole to 
better the system237.  
McCain said that while Maple Leaf is prepared for any outcome it would prefer to 
make the existing system work. “If supply management went away we would survive 
and thrive. But that is not, I reiterate not, our first choice.” 238 
Like primary production, most of the poultry and dairy processing industry is 
concentrated in Quebec and Ontario. In 2005, 67 per cent of dairy processors were in Quebec and 
234 Exceldor, “Mémoire présenté à la Commission sur l’avenir de l’agriculture et de l’agroalimentaire québécois.” 
235 Ibid., 5-7.   
236 Ibid., 2. 
237Knisley, “Michael McCain on Food Safety and Supply Management.” 
238 Ibid. 
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 Ontario239. In 2011, 70 per cent of egg processors in Canada were in those two provinces240. 
There appears to be an exception in poultry. Only 36 per cent of Canada’s poultry processing 
plants are in Quebec and Ontario, whereas Alberta alone accounts for 39 per cent241. This 
observation though shows that although supply management is foremost an interest of central 
Canada, other Canadian provinces also have important stakes in the system. 
Additionally, major financial institutions have endorsed supply management as well. 
Among supporters of the GO5 Coalition are found the: Royal Bank of Canada, National Bank of 
Canada, and the Mouvement Desjardins242. According to the UPA’s former president Jacques 
Proulx, in 1993 most of the money borrowed by Quebec farmers to invest in production quotas 
was loaned by Desjardins243. And among the speakers at the November 11, 2012, rally were 
representatives of Farm Credit Canada, the National Bank and of the Bank of Montreal244. In 
their speeches, they respectively outline that they are favourable to supply management. One of 
the main reasons that surfaces is that loans to farms under supply management are more secure, 
because of the stability of the market. There is an assured market for commodities produced and 
guaranteed high prices received for them. 
In summary, both the poultry and dairy primary production and processing are mainly 
concentrated in central Canada. Most importantly, these two branches of the industry have similar 
interests. Unlike the agricultural producers who stand as a monolith in support of supply 
239 “Dairy Processors in Canada,” Canadian Dairy Information Centre, accessed July 10, 2013, 
http://www.dairyinfo.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=dff-fcil&s2=proc-trans&page=plant. 
240 “Provincial Poultry Facts – 2011,” Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, accessed July 12, 2013, 
http://www.agr.gc.ca/poultry-volaille/infprov_eng.htm. 
241 “Annual Report 2012,” Chicken Farmers of Canada, 26-27. 
242 “About GO5 – Our Supporters,” GO5 Coalition, accessed June 20, 2013, 
http://www.go5quebec.ca/en/appuis.php. 
243 McKenna and Drohan, “Quebec Farmers Warn Goodale on GATT Stance.” 
244 “About GO5 – Our Activities,” GO5 Coalition, accessed June 20, 2013, 
http://www.go5quebec.ca/fr/rassemblement-de-la-coalition-G05.php. 
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 management, the processing industry appears to be more divided. Still, the most important dairy 
and poultry processors support or remain neutral on the issue of supply management. 
Furthermore, important Canadian financial institutions have also publicly endorsed supply 
management.  
 
Electoral issues 
 
 Among federal political parties, supply management garners unconditional support. The 
Reform Party was the only major federal party to be against supply management245. All others 
have been in support, as can be seen in their electoral platforms and stances between elections. 
The best illustration of the strong support supply management has among parties is the motion 
that was introduced by MP André Bellavance from the Bloc Québécois and passed in the House 
of Commons on November 22nd, 2005. As Jeffrey Simpson from the Globe and Mail writes, “in 
2005, the House of Commons unanimously passed a resolution instructing negotiators to defend 
the existing supply management arrangements. Any change, according to the Commons, would 
be unacceptable. This from a group who couldn’t agree today is Tuesday”246. Although the 
motion is not legally binding, it is a clear instruction to government and Canadian negotiators 
about the House of Commons’ members’ view on supply management in the context of 
international trade agreements. The exact same motion was voted upon in Quebec’s National 
245 Vieira, “Does Farm Business Have Ottawa Cowed?” 
246 Simpson, “The Ugly Canadian at Global Trade Talks in Geneva.” 
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 Assembly the previous month247. And again this support shows how Quebec’s political circles 
have been particularly active in the defence of supply management. 
 Opposition parties have held incumbent parties accountable to their commitment to 
supply management. For example, in 2006, “Liberal, NDP and Bloc MPs instructed the 
government to ‘take immediate action to strengthen import controls,’ to seek emergency 
negotiations will all our trading partners and to impose high tariffs on all milk ingredients that 
cross the border248.” More recently, the Toronto Star reported that “all three federal parties 
support supply management. The Liberals, in particular, rushed to the system’s defence [earlier in 
2013] when the Conservative government moved to enter the talks for a new Trans-Pacific trade 
agreement249.” The Conservative Party and the Bloc Québéois included the defence of supply 
management in their platform in the last federal election, in 2011250. The New Democratic Party 
and the Liberal Party did not include it, but made public commitments during the electoral 
campaign251. The explanation behind this uniform defence of supply management is, at least in 
part, electoral.  
A review of press articles from 1980 to 2013 reveals that a number of journalists and 
political analysts identify electoral reasons as being the motivation behind this stable defence of 
supply management by political parties and successive governments. A recurrent idea is that the 
defence of supply management, because it is concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, is electorally 
247 Skogstad, “Gestion de l’offre, fédéralisme canadien et négociations commerciales.” 
248 Reynolds, “Stop Milking Outdated Agricultural Quotas.” 
249 Toronto Star, “Tackling Sacred Cows.” 
250 “Here for Canada, ” Conservative Party of Canada, accessed July 25, 2013, 
http://www.conservative.ca/media/2012/06/ConservativePlatform2011_ENs.pdf, 59; “Plateforme électorale du Bloc 
Québécois,” Équiterre, April 5, 2011. Accessed July 25, 2013, http://www.equiterre.org/communique/plateforme-
electorale-du-bloc-quebecois-en-phase-avec-les-grandes-preoccupations-d%E2%80%99equite. 
251 “Élections fédérales 2011” La Terre de Chez Nous, April 22, 2011. Accessed July 27, 2013, 
http://www.laterre.ca/politique/Elections-federales-2011-les-partis-rencontrent-lu/.  
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 advantageous to gain rural ridings in these crucial provinces. The following quotes from major 
Canadian newspapers show this point: 
With most of the industry concentrated in Quebec and Ontario, that is a major 
political danger to the already shaky Mulroney government252. (Financial Post, 1990) 
 
Because of the nature of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, the supply-
management lobby has disproportionate clout. Rural ridings usually have fewer 
residents per MP than urban ridings [...] The supply management farmers are also 
concentrated in key regions and key ridings: many eastern farmers are involved in 
supply marketing schemes [...] Many Quebec and Ontario Members of parliament 
owe their seats to farmers who depend upon supply management253.  (Globe and 
Mail, 1990)  
 
If supply management is threatened, so is Mr. Mulroney’s popularity with dairy and 
poultry farmers, who are concentrated in Quebec and Ontario. Given Canada’s 
constitutional crisis, alienating a large group of Quebec voters, no matter what their 
occupation, would not be politically wise254. (Globe and Mail, 1991) 
 
The battle for rural Ontario flared up yesterday as the top four parties jockeyed for the 
farm vote in next week’s election. The region is seen by the Canadian Alliance as its 
best bet for making a breakthrough into central Canada. In a debate sponsored by the 
Ontario Federation of Agriculture during its annual meeting in Toronto yesterday, all 
four parties pledged to defend supply management at world trade talks and to spend 
more on aid for farmers.255 (Toronto Star, 2000) 
 
[Michael Hart, a former Canadian trade official, author of an CD Howe Institute 
study on supply management] said supply management is being propped up by 
politicians who won’t change the system because they fear losing votes in rural 
Ontario and Quebec, where many of the country’s dairy farmers live. The status quo 
252 Solomon, “Canada’s Contortions on Supply Management.” 
253 Janigan, “Why Chickens Don’t Come Cheap.” 
254 Drohan, “Canada Makes Last-Ditch Bid to Save Marketing Boards.” 
255 Laidlaw, “Politicians Seek to Harvest Farm Support.” 
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 also survives, he said, because consumers aren’t sufficiently angry to demand 
change256. (Globe and Mail, 2005) 
 
There are three reasons why the two are different for the Tories: location, location, 
location...To be fair to the Conservatives, they have consistently stood four-square in 
favour of supply management. They know that tinkering with the system would likely 
sink their hopes in the rural parts of Quebec and Ontario where they are strongest257. 
(Financial Post, 2006) 
 
Supply management is a sensitive issue for the minority Harper government, which is 
trying to win more seats in Ontario and Quebec where support for it is strongest258. 
(Globe and Mail, 2008) 
 
The Conservative attack ads unveiled Monday suggest one front of the election 
campaign, whenever it comes, will be fought in the fields of rural Quebec. In this 
theatre, victory will be determined by whichever party shouts loudest of its love for 
Quebec’s dairy industry...Prime Minister Stephen Harper has defended supply 
management since he united the right – one presumes for political reasons. He has 
told his APEC partners that reforming supply management would be political 
suicide259. (National Post, 2011) 
 
Supply management is nothing short of price fixing. It is a drain on consumers and 
the food industry. But it is very popular with a small group of influential farmers, 
largely in rural Ontario and Quebec ridings that the Tories, like the Liberals before 
them, are eager to keep or capture260. (National Post, 2011) 
 
After all, although the dairy lobby is among the most powerful in the country, its 
members are largely centred in Quebec ridings where the Conservatives have been 
shut out and in Eastern Ontario, where support for the Tories is so deep that the party 
might even hold some of the ridings in the next election despite the outrage of 
farmers261. (Globe and Mail, 2012) 
256 Tuck, “Dairy, Poultry Systems Criticized.” 
257 Ivison, “Bread and Butter Issues a Delicate Dance.” 
258 Chase, “Lowered Tariffs Won’t Hurt Canada’s Food Supply: Fortier.” 
259 Ivison, “We Stand Alone, Because of Cheese.” 
260 National Post, “Ending Supply Management.” 
261 Ibbitson, “Why Protecting Dairy, Egg Farmers Is No Sacred Cow for PM.” 
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  Of course, these journalistic quotes are not scientific evidence that supply management is 
maintained for electoral reasons. They only express reflections from non-academics who may or 
may not be very knowledgeable about the issue of supply management. Still, this collection of 
quotes shows that there is a shared perception among observers that electoral politics play a role 
in the preservation of the supply management system.  
    The electoral thesis has been recently countered by a 2012 University of Calgary study, 
authored by former Liberal MP Martha Hall Findlay262. This study is the first to empirically test 
the electoral hypothesis. It compiled numbers by ridings and concludes that to justify the defence 
of supply management for electoral reasons is not rational, at least for Conservatives at the 
moment. Hall Findlay writes that several politicians think they have to support supply 
management, but that this idea is in fact not supported by data263. 
 
Not only are they far less numerous, the farms that are left are concentrated in 
electoral districts so predominantly supportive of one party or another that, even if a 
proposal to dismantle supply management were received so negatively that some 
people would change their votes, there are few if any electoral districts where those 
votes would be enough to change the electoral results.  
 
There are only 13 ridings in Canada with more than 300 dairy farms. And to put 
things into relative electoral perspective, these are ridings which have an average of 
80,000 registered voters each. Eight of these are in Quebec, three of which (based on 
both the 2008 and 2011 elections) are held comfortably by Conservatives. Three are 
held by the NDP, two by the Bloc Quebecois, but in four of these, the Conservatives 
did not even come second, so the situation is not likely to change one way or the 
262 Hall Findlay, “Supply Management: Problems, Politics – And Possibilities.”  
263 Ibid., 20. 
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 other. The other five of this group of 13 are in Ontario, strongly held by 
Conservatives, each by over 10,000 votes in 2011264. 
 
Yet, it must be pointed out that Hall Findlay assumes the only supporters of supply management 
are farmers, dairy farmers more particularly. The exclusion of poultry and egg farmers from the 
study is understandable given dairy production is much more important (see the Canada graph in 
Appendix H). But the numbers do not take into account all of the people that could be 
sympathetic to supply management: families and the entourage of supply management farmers, 
employees of the processing industry, employees of the supply management production supply 
chain (breeders, feeders, machinery, chemicals, etc.), and more generally, citizens of 
communities with a strong presence of supply-managed farms. The question is not whether or not 
the maintenance of supply management is rationally in their interest, but rather about their 
perception. It is at least possible to speculate that supply management is supported by a wider 
range of individuals than dairy farmers only. A national survey from 2002 did show that 82 per 
cent of Canadians thought Canadian agriculture should be shielded from foreign competition265, 
although the high rates on this poll could be based on a misunderstanding of what protection 
entails. 
 Although some of the reasoning by Hall Findlay’s study may be flawed, its conclusions 
may be accurate. Electoral reasons may not be rational ones to continue to defend supply 
management. Even though a wider range of citizens may support the system, it is unlikely that it 
will influence the vote of those who do not have stakes in it. On the other hand, although Hall 
Findlay’s study demonstrated that hard data do not corroborate the electoral justification, it does 
264 Hall Findlay, “Supply Management: Problems, Politics – And Possibilities,” 22. 
265 Wise, “Why Supply-Managed Agriculture Is Good For Us.” 
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 not rule out the possibility that supply management is defended for electoral motivations. In fact, 
she states that the report: 
examines — and challenges — the political assumptions behind politicians’ 
traditional unwillingness to challenge supply management, suggesting that those 
assumptions are no longer valid, and that the political risks are much smaller than 
previously assumed266. 
 
She therefore claims electoral motives have infused the defence of the system by politicians, but 
that this claim does not hold anymore and that supply management should not be defended based 
on these motives. 
 
 Nationalism and separatism in Quebec 
 
 The close relationship central Canada provincial governments have developed with 
farmers’ organizations is particularly strong and exceptional in Quebec. Furthermore, Quebec 
separatism was at its peak in the 1980s and 1990s and is another explanation of Canada’s 
position. 
The Western prairies’ economies are more dependent on agriculture than Quebec, but 
there is something special about the agricultural sector in the French province. First, the Quebec 
government is even more committed to the state-assistance paradigm than in other provinces. 
Indeed, there appears to be an ideological cleavage between Quebec and the rest of Canada in 
relation to agriculture267. In the 1970s and 1980s, the provincial government invested massively 
in agriculture, more than any other province, in order to encourage the growth and 
266 Hall Findlay, “Supply Management: Problems, Politics – And Possibilities,” 3. 
267 Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs and Paradigms,” 497. 
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 competitiveness of the sector268. Accordingly, Quebec’s agriculture flourished during the 
1980s269. Wilson gives the income-stabilization programs as an example of the commitment of 
the Quebec government to the province’s agricultural sector: “It was a policy motivated by both 
politics and economics, but at its base was an ideological commitment to rural Quebec and a view 
of agriculture as a potential economic engine for the province”270. Additionally, “with its 
expenditure and regulatory latitude over agricultural policy diminished by international 
agreements and deficit-driven fiscal restraint, the Government of Canada’s capacity to 
demonstrate the continuing benefits of federalism to Quebec agriculture is further 
handicapped”271. Indeed, there has been a progressive disengagement of the federal government 
from Quebec’s agricultural sector and federalism was perceived by Quebec farmers as being 
detrimental to their interests272. UPA’s president endorsed independence in 1995 and after the 
referendum’s failure, explicitly asked for agriculture to become an exclusively provincial 
power273. 
Furthermore, UPA has a particular status. Indeed, in 1972, the Quebec government granted 
the organization, through legislation, the monopoly of representation of the province’s farmers. 
Skogstad argues that general organizations’ influence has decreased and that in parallel, sectoral 
organizations have become the most influential producers’ groups. UPA is the only exception to 
268 Skogstad, “Federalism and Agricultural Marketing,” 93. 
269 Wilson, Farming the System, 194. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture,” 33. 
272 Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture.” 
273 Ibid., 28. 
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 this trend274. It has power and influence; it has strong links with the provincial agriculture 
ministry, the Ministère de l’Agriculture et des Pêches du Québec (MAPAQ)275.  
UPA has always been a strong advocate of supply management. Its links are much 
stronger with Quebec’s government than with the federal government. And, as explained above, 
because the Quebec government has such a close relationship with UPA, it has become an 
important ally to supply management as well. Furthermore, supply management is more 
important to the province’s agriculture than to any other province, providing about 40 per cent of 
the provincial farm cash receipts in 2010276. The dairy sector is particularly important. In 2011, 
fifty per cent of Canadian dairy farms were in Quebec277 and about 27 per cent of Quebec farms 
were dairy in 2006278. Skogstad says that if Quebec seceded, supply management would lose its 
most important voice279. Her argument implies that UPA and the Quebec dairy sector are very 
powerful and have had preponderant influence on the maintenance of supply management in the 
country. 
 
Separatism 
The Quebec political separatist movement truly emerged during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
two sovereignist political parties from which were formed the Parti Québécois, the Mouvement 
274 Skogstad, “The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy,” 330-331. 
275 Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture,” 28. 
276 Refer to graph on page 67. 
277 “About Us,” Dairy Farmers of Canada, accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.dairyfarmers.ca/who-we-are/about-
us; “2011 Annual Report,” Fédération des Producteurs de Lait du Québec, accessed May 10, 2013, 
http://www.lait.org/fichiers/RapportAnnuel/?id=FPLQ-2011, 12. 
278 “Farms, by farm type and province,” Statistics Canada, accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/agrc35a-eng.htm. 
279 Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture.” 
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 Souveraineté-Association and the Ralliement National were respectively founded in 1967 and 
1966. The two merged into the Parti Québécois in 1968. Sovereignty became a popular cause in 
Quebec from the 1970s to the 1990s. The sentiment is still present and the sovereignist cause is 
still alive. The rate of support for sovereignty has wavered between about 35 and 70 per cent 
between 1989 and 2008280. Support was at its highest in 1990-91, but it has remained above 35 
per cent from 1995 to 2008. Among the highlight moments of the movement are the referendums 
of 1980 and 1995. In 1980, the “No” won with 59.56 per cent of the votes; the “Yes” obtained 
40.44 per cent. The 1995 referendum results were much closer: the “Yes” clan lost with 49.42 per 
cent of the votes while the “No” got 50.58 per cent281. The following table compiles the 
percentage of vote obtained by the Bloc Québécois in Quebec in federal elections since 1993, the 
first election for which it presented candidates and the Parti Québécois in Quebec provincial 
elections since 1981, the decade in which started the Uruguay Round. The Bloc Québécois and 
the Parti Québécois are the two main Quebec-based separatist political parties. The percentage of 
the vote they got in elections during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s are instructive about the level of 
support for sovereignty in Quebec during that period. 
 
 
 
 
280 Yale and Durand, “What Did Quebeckers Want?” 252; 254. 
281 “Référendums au Québec,” Directeur Général des Élections du Québec, accessed July 5, 2013, 
http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/francais/tableaux/referendums-quebec-8484.php. 
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 Table 12. Percentage of the vote obtained by the Bloc 
Québécois in federal elections in Quebec and by the Parti 
Québécois in provincial elections, 1981-2007 
Bloc Québécois Année Parti Québécois 
  1981 49.26 
  1982   
  1983   
  1984   
  1985 38.69 
  1986   
  1987   
  1988   
  1989 40.16 
  1990   
  1991   
  1992   
49.3 1993   
  1994 44.75 
  1995   
  1996   
37.9 1997   
  1998 42.87 
  1999   
39.9 2000   
  2001   
  2002   
  2003 33.24 
48.9 2004   
  2005   
42.1 2006   
  2007 28.35 
Source: For Bloc Québécois : data compiled from “Past Elections,” Elections 
Canada, 
http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=pas&document=inde
x&lang=e; Drouilly, “L’élection fédérale du 25 octobre 
1993,” http://www.pum.umontreal.ca/apqc/93_94/drouilly/drouilly.htm.  
For Parti Québécois : data compiled from “Élections générales,” Directeur 
général des élections du Québec, 
http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/francais/provincial/resultats-
electoraux/elections-generales.php?e=45#e. 
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  The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 and negotiations ended in 1994. As the 1993-
election results show, the Bloc Québécois garnered almost 50 per cent of the vote in Quebec. 
Separatist, or at least nationalist, feeling was high. Although the Liberal Party was in power in 
Quebec from 1985 to 1994, the Parti Québécois still obtained 39 per cent of the vote, on average, 
in the 1985 and 1989 elections. The popularity alone of a sovereignist party in a province is 
enough for the federal government to take this variable into account while formulating policy. 
The federal government at least has Quebec sovereignty in the back of its mind when elaborating 
policy that will directly affect the province. And supply management is particularly important for 
Quebec. In terms of number of farms and volume of farm cash receipts, it is the province that is 
most dependent on supply-managed farms. 
It is also possible that in addition to Quebec nationalism and exceptionalism associated 
with agriculture and the influence of UPA, supply management has been maintained by the 
federal government because of the existence of Quebec separatism. Quebec farmers do not seem 
to be more separatist than Quebec citizens in general. It seems that the proportion of separatists 
among farmers was about the same as in the general population; approximately half favoured 
separation in 1995282. An Ipsos-Reid poll also showed 44 per cent of Quebec’s farmers said they 
were going to vote for the Bloc Québécois in the 2004 federal election. In contrast, among 
Canadian farmers in general, 60 per cent declared they planned to vote for the Conservatives, 23 
per cent for the Liberals, and 7 per cent for the NDP283. Although support for sovereignty only 
appears to be 50-50 among Quebec farmers, it would be reasonable to think that if the federal 
government had announced a position in the Uruguay or the Doha Round threatening supply 
282 Belzile, “Le monde rural appuie la souveraineté.”  
283 Tuck, “Tories, Liberals Spar on Agri-Food, Farm Policies.” 
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 management, it could have resulted into an increased support to separatism among farmers, and 
perhaps even enough to put the support for independence over the 50 per cent mark.  
  
Quebec electoral ridings with the most dairy farms 
 The Hall Findlay research study compiled the number of dairy farms per federal electoral 
riding across Canada. Quebec counts 75 ridings and for the purpose of this present research the 
ridings that have more than 250 dairy farms have been identified. The map on the following page 
highlights those districts and the following graph lists the number of dairy farms in those ridings 
for 2006. 
Table 13. Quebec federal electoral ridings with more than 250 dairy 
farms, 2006 
  Number of farms 
Montmagny-L'Islet-Kamouraska-Rivière du Loup 561 
Beauce 465 
Richmond-Arthabaska 449 
Bas Richelieu-Nicolet-Bécancour 428 
Mégantic-L'Érable 388 
Lévis-Bellechasse 358 
Beauharnois-Salaberry 351 
Compton-Stanstead 322 
Lotbinière-Chutes de la Chaudière 280 
St-Hyacinthe-Bagot 266 
Roberval-Lac-St-Jean 256 
 
Source : Data compiled from Hall Findlay, “2011 and 2008 Election 
Results for Electoral Districts With More Than 150 Dairy Farms,” 
http://2013.marthahallfindlay.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/2012-06-
21-Article-Supply-   Management-Problems-Politics-
And-Possibilities-School-of-Public-Policy-UofC.pdf, 26. 
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Figure 3. Quebec federal electoral ridings with more than 250 dairy farms, 2006. Source: Original 
map from “Map of Quebec,” Elections Canada, 
http://www.elections.ca/res/cir/maps/map.asp?type=prov&map=QC&lang=e. Modified with data 
from Table 12. 
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 The portrait would be more complete if poultry and egg farms were also represented in those 
numbers and in the electoral map, but those numbers are not available per riding. Furthermore, it 
would be more interesting to present data for the mid-1980s and the end of the 1990s, when 
negotiations were ongoing, particularly given that the number of dairy farms has extensively 
declined over the last forty years. From 2001 to 2011, the number of dairy farms in Canada has 
gone from 18 321 to 12 207284. In 1989, that number was approximately 34 000285. The current 
number of farms by electoral riding is therefore not representative of the number of farms during 
the Uruguay Round. Although closer, they are not the accurate numbers for the beginning of the 
Doha Round either. It will be assumed that the ridings (or regions since ridings have changed 
over the last forty years) with the most farms in 2006 were the same during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 The map with the highlighted ridings was set against a map of the distribution of the vote in 
the 1995 referendum and a table which compiles the political affiliation of the incumbent in the 
11 ridings for all federal elections since 1984. 
 
 
 
 
 
284 “Census of Agriculture, farms classified by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), Canada 
and provinces, every five years,” Statistics Canada, accessed July 5, 2013, 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a05?lang=eng&id=0040014&pattern=0040014&searchTypeByValue=1&p2=35. 
285 Fox, “Food Marketing Boards Brace for Drastic Reform.” 
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 Table 14. Incumbent party in Quebec federal electoral ridings with more than 250 dairy farms, 
1984-2011 
  1984 1988 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2008 2011 
Montmagny-L'Islet-Kamouraska-R       BQ / Lib BQ / Lib BQ BQ BQ NPD 
Beauce PC PC Ind Lib Lib Lib C C C 
Richmond-Arthabaska Lib PC BQ PC PC BQ BQ BQ BQ 
Bas-Richelieu-Nicolet-Becancour PC PC BQ BQ BQ BQ BQ BQ BQ 
Mégantic-L'Érable PC PC BQ BQ Lib BQ C C C 
Lévis-Bellechasse PC PC BQ BQ BQ BQ C C C 
Beauharnois-Salaberry PC PC BQ BQ Lib BQ BQ BQ NPD 
Compton-Stanstead PC PC BQ PC Lib BQ BQ BQ NPD 
Lotbinière-Chutes de la Chaudière PC PC BQ BQ BQ BQ C C C 
St-Hyacinthe-Bagot PC PC BQ BQ BQ BQ BQ BQ NPD 
Roberval-Lac-St-Jean PC PC BQ BQ BQ BQ BQ /C C C 
 
* Montmagny-L’Islet-Kamouraska-Rimouski was left blank in 1984, 1988 and 1993 because the 
ridings changed extensively during these years and the current riding was formed from multiple 
ridings.  
Source : Data compiled from “History of Federal Ridings Since 1867,” Parliament of Canada, 
accessed August 2, 2013, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/FederalRidingsHistory/hfer.asp?Search=Rres&ridProvin
ce=10&submit1=Recherche&Language=E. 
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Figure 4. Map of the percentage of vote for the “yes” in the 1995 Quebec referendum on 
independence by federal electoral riding. Source: Hill, “Quebec Referendum (30 Oct 1995) by 
Federal Electoral District,” http://www.canpolitics.com/quebec1995.html. 
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 For one, the above table and figure tell us that all of the ridings where there are the most 
dairy farms in Quebec elected the Progressive Conservatives in 1988. Almost all of them elected 
the Bloc Québécois in 1993. In the year and months before the 1993 election, Conservatives 
could have been wary of the growing popularity of the Bloc Québécois, but it would be 
surprising that their sentiment be particular only to these ridings. The Bloc Québécois swept the 
entire province in 1993; they won 54 of the 75 seats. And most of all, the 1995 referendum map 
and table show that the region where dairy farms are concentrated, the South-East of Quebec, is 
not the heartland of separatism. Out of the eleven ridings in question, it is only in Roberval-Lac-
Saint-Jean where more than 65 per cent of people voted for sovereignty. The other ten ridings are 
more or less divided. In a little less than half did more than 50 per cent vote for sovereignty. 
Some of these ridings are on the edge: 45 to 50 per cent and 50 to 55 per cent, but some are 
below 35 and above 55. In other words, there doesn’t seem to be a clear pattern. There is no 
correlation between supply management and support to sovereignty. This outcome could show 
that these regions have changing political affiliation and are therefore electorally of interest for 
political parties in times of elections. Yet, this would demand much more data to be 
demonstrated.  
 More generally, this brings us to the importance of perception in relation to the idea of 
Quebec separatism and nationalism. Perhaps it is not useful to analyse numbers. Perhaps it does 
not matter if ridings where supply-managed farms are concentrated are populated by an-above 
average level of sovereignists or are swing ridings which demand more attention in order for 
them not to fall into the separatist realm. Perhaps the picture should be looked upon with a step 
back.  
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 Brian Mulroney, who was the Prime Minister of Canada from 1984 to 1993, was worried 
about national unity, and supply management, although a minor issue for Canadians as a whole, 
could have been maintained with the optic of not providing munitions to separatist politicians in 
Quebec. The following quote demonstrates this idea: “Mr. Mulroney and his ministers have 
pleaded the case of Canadian unity at GATT to keep marketing-board practices going286.” Other 
quotes from the Canadian press show there was a worry supply management would be 
instrumentalized by sovereignists to gain more support in rural Quebec. 
Any GATT agreement that damages supply management will provide fodder for 
Quebec separatists. Already, the head of Quebec’s powerful UPA, Jacques Proulx, 
has indicated that the federal government will be held responsible if the talks 
don’t turn out the way Quebec’s 13,200 dairy farmers want287.  
 
Jean Lapierre, House of Commons leader for the separatist Bloc Quebecois, 
already appears to be smacking his lips at the opportunities that would be 
presented by a GATT deal reached at the expense of dairy, egg and poultry 
farmers. “If (farm) quotas fall, a lot of federalists will fall as well,’ Mr. Lapierre 
predicted at a news conference yesterday288”.  
 
“Parizeau would like nothing better than to see the federal government fall and 
then he could scream that the federal government doesn’t look after the interests 
of Quebec farmers289” (quote from Liberal Party agriculture critic Maurice Foster) 
 
While insisting the issue was a national one, Wilson conceded that supply 
management is particularly sensitive in Quebec, which has half of Canada’s dairy 
farmers. Farmer lobbyists have warned that separatists will use any retreat on 
supply management to undermine federalism290. 
 
286 Simpson, “Fighting to the Finish, and Now the Finish Has Come.” 
287 Freeman and Fagan, “Quebec Silence Loud at GATT Trade Talks.” 
288 Ibid. 
289 Winsor, “GATT May Fuel Regional Woe in Replay of Trudeau Wrangle.” 
290 McCarthy, “Wilson Promises GATT Fight to Save Supply Management.” 
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  Furthermore, the Bloc Québécois stated in October 1993, a few days before Election Day, 
that an independent Quebec would be able to continue to supply half of Canada’s dairy products 
and that farmers could continue to enjoy supply management291. In 1995, the Quebec 
government, formed by the Parti Québécois, issued a report stating similar ideas292. Both of 
Quebec’s main independentist political parties made explicit statements about separation and 
supply management, possibly to reassure or convince supply-managed farmers in Quebec. The 
federal government subsequently responded to the Parti Québécois’ report: 
Mr. Goodale [federal agriculture Minister] scoffed yesterday at a Quebec 
government report that argues Canada would still be dependent on Quebec industrial 
milk after separation. Mr. Goodale called that naive and presumptuous […] But Mr. 
Goodale said it’s ludicrous to think non-Canadians could be part of the Canadian 
dairy system […] He said a newly independent Quebec wouldn’t have any historic 
rights, and U.S. trade negotiators would insist on opening up the Quebec milk 
market293. 
 
Supply management has therefore been the subject of rifts between separatists and federalists. In 
his memoirs, Roy McLaren, Minister of International Trade under Jean Chrétien from 1993 to 
1996 and therefore directly involved in the Uruguay Round negotiations, reports that Chrétien 
told him he did not agree with Canada defending supply management. Chrétien reportedly told 
McLaren that they had to defend supply management because of Quebec, because Quebec 
farmers were all separatists294. This last example illustrates the importance of perception when 
analyzing Quebec separatism and its interpretation by federal politicians.   
291 Scott, “Separate Quebec Would Retain Quota of Milk, Bloc Says.” 
292 Globe and Mail. “Goodale Rejects Dairy Report.” 
293 Ibid. 
294 Watson, “Indulging Quebec.” 
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  The maintenance or dismantlement of the supply management system is not an issue that 
would influence the vote of most Canadians. But given that their livelihoods depend on it, 
supply-managed farmers could change their allegiance according to which camp supports supply 
management. Yet, supply management directly affects a small minority of the Canadian 
population; supply managed farmers constitute only 0.05 per cent of the Canadian population295. 
If people hired in production (farm workers) and in the processing industry are included this 
percentage rises to 0.3 per cent296. But as mentioned before, supply management is supported by 
a wider range of citizens than farmers and processing-industry employers and most of all, the 
federal government, for any policy, takes into account the effect it will have on the level of 
support to Quebec sovereignty. To conclude, those numbers are very small. Again, it may point 
in the direction that support to supply management is not based on mathematical calculations of 
the effect of a repudiation of supply management on the support for separatism in Quebec. 
Support could rather be based on an impression that the dismantlement of supply management 
could revive separatism and provide arguments to sovereignist politicians. 
  
 
 
 
 
295 “Population,” Statistics Canada, accessed July 5, 2013, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/12-581-x/2012000/pop-
fra.htm; number of members of supply-managed national agencies, from 2012 annual reports. 
296 Data compiled from: “Dairy Farm Operators,” Canadian Dairy Information Centre, accessed July 3, 2013, 
http://www.dairyinfo.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=dff-fcil&s2=farm-ferme&s3=impact&page=intro; “Number of 
Employees in the Dairy Product Manufacturing Sector,” Canadian Dairy Information Centre, accessed July 3, 2013, 
http://www.dairyinfo.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=dff-fcil&s2=proc-trans&s3=impact&page=intro; “2012 Annual Report,” 
Chicken Farmers of Canada, accessed July 3, 2013, http://chickenfarmers.ca/upload/Documents/2012-annual-
report.pdf, 27; “Egg Industry – Economic Impact,” Manitoba Egg Farmers, accessed July 3, 2013, 
http://www.mbegg.mb.ca/industry-economic.html.   
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 In summary, Canada has been holding an inconsistent position in the agricultural trade 
negotiations of the Uruguay and Doha rounds. It has been advocating a strong liberalization of 
agricultural trade in order to secure market access gains for the export-dependent agricultural 
sector in Canada. In parallel, it has also been advocating for the maintenance of the supply 
management system. Canada’s position has therefore been somewhat paradoxical, pushing for 
both liberalization and protectionism in agricultural trade policy. And despite strong criticisms 
and lobbying efforts from other countries such as the US, Australia and NZ, Canada has 
maintained the same position for the last 30 years. Canada has had a preference for free trade 
since the 1980s and the thesis is therefore less about explaining Canada’s dual position than 
about explaining the consistent defence of supply management by the Canadian government. 
The thesis has demonstrated that several factors explain the stable support for supply 
management. First, Canada has continued to defend supply management internationally because 
of the preponderant influence of the farmers’ organizations from the supply-managed sector. In 
Business and Politics, Coleman indicates that interest groups can fulfill two roles: policy 
advocacy and policy participation. For the former, the influence of organizations is impacted by 
resources such as budget and staff. And indeed, supply-managed organizations have a smaller 
membership, but much higher budgets and staff than organizations from the export-dependent 
sector. The organizational resources of the supply-managed sectors provide an explanation to the 
wider influence they have. As for policy participation, the influence of organizations relative to 
this role is determined by several elements. Organizations must be vertically integrated and their 
membership must be mutually exclusive. They must be formed around narrow and specialized 
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 interests and be given privileges from the state. This is indeed more applicable to the supply-
managed organizations than to the export-dependent ones. The thesis shows the high level of 
collaboration and coordination between farmers’ organizations in the supply-management 
system. There is a high degree of integration between these organizations as well, especially in 
Quebec. The level of collaboration is also illustrated by the coalitions these organizations have 
formed over the issue of agricultural trade.   
Second, supply management has been defended consistently by the Canadian government 
because it is foremost in the interest of dominant Quebec and Ontario. Supply-managed farms are 
heavily concentrated in central Canada and the Quebec and Ontario governments have in turned 
become strong advocates of the system within the federation. This is partly due to the fact that 
supply-managed farmers’ organizations have developed corporatist relationships with 
government, especially in Quebec and Ontario. These provincial governments therefore see the 
supply-managed organizations as partners. Corporatism typically entails a tripartite relationship: 
producers, government and processors in agriculture. The convergence of interests is also 
observable between producers and processors in the supply-managed sector in Canada. The main 
dairy and poultry processors, as well as major Canadian financial institutions, have openly 
supported the system.  
Third and lastly, electoral and national unity reasons explain the advocacy for supply 
management in multilateral trade negotiations. Many observers have attributed the survival of 
supply management to the concentrated presence of supply-managed farms in swing rural ridings 
of the electorally important provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Although Hall-Findlay has 
demonstrated that the electoral justification is not met by hard data, it is very probable that supply 
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 management has been maintained because politicians perceive it could be electorally dangerous 
to dismantle the system. Similarly, perception could play a role in an additional manner. Quebec 
separatism is a recurring variable in Canadian politics and given the importance of supply 
management for Quebec farmers, it could be another factor to explain Canada’s position. 
Subsequent Canadian governments could have been wary of the impact of the dismantlement of 
the system on the level of support for separatism, especially given that the multilateral 
negotiations occurred at times when national unity was a cause for concern in Canada.    
As all of these factors point in the same direction, it is difficult to assess which one has 
had more impact on the defence of supply management. In other words, each of these variables 
directs us towards the maintenance of supply management. It is not possible to measure the 
relative weight of each factor. Still, the thesis puts forward plausible explanations and more 
importantly shows that it is difficult to fully distinguish the variables from each other as most of 
them overlap.    
Furthermore, this research contributes to key debates in the field of political science. As 
outlined at the beginning of the thesis, a significant discussion is around the sources of foreign 
policy. With the exception of classic realists, there is a near-consensus among scholars that 
domestic factors do influence foreign policy. The debate revolves around the weight of internal 
factors in comparison to that of external factors. Among domestic factors that are commonly 
underlined in research are domestic interest groups. Their influence on trade policy has been 
demonstrated in several academic works.   
This research has intentionally restricted itself to domestic explanatory factors. This has 
mainly been done to set reasonable limits to the scope of the research. External factors could have 
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 been looked upon, but they were set aside to make the research realistic in latitude. For example, 
it would have been interesting to research the impact of the protectionist positions of major 
negotiation participants such as the US and the EU on Canada’s position. It is possible to posit 
that Canada’s status quo position would be more difficult to maintain if the two main negotiators 
did not have status quo positions themselves. Yet, external factors were excluded from the 
research for practical reasons. Despite the deliberate omission of external sources, the thesis 
demonstrated that domestic sources have had an important impact on the Canadian position for 
agricultural trade negotiations. It is reasonable to think that Canada’s position is at least in great 
part due to domestic factors. More specifically, domestic interest groups – farmers’ organizations 
– seemed to have played a substantial role in the defence of supply management.     
The second debate to which the research contributes is the impact of federalism on foreign 
policy. The thesis shows that in the case of agricultural trade negotiations, Canadian federalism 
had an impact on the elaboration of the Canadian position. Skogstad had previously demonstrated 
that because agriculture is under shared jurisdiction, provincial input is sought by the federal 
when negotiating international agreements that affect agriculture. This research corroborates that 
provincial governments have lobbied the federal government in relation to supply management, 
especially the governments of Quebec and Ontario. Furthermore, regionalism has also had an 
important impact on the defence of supply management.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that defence of supply management domestically and on 
the international scene by the federal government can also be due to other minor factors. As 
mentioned before, it could be due to the positions of the other major actors in the negotiations, 
the US and the EU. Another possible factor could be policy success. Hall argues that for a 
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 paradigm to change, failure of the previous paradigm has to be experienced297. Supply 
management is usually seen as a success in terms of supply and revenue stability. Plus, it does 
not necessitate state subsidies. Supply management could therefore be maintained by the federal 
government because of its success298. Plus, processors are becoming more and more concentrated 
and supply management allows thousands of individual producers from these sectors to have a 
strong negotiation position with them. Furthermore, “because of its importance for employment, 
regional development and trade, governments have considered the maintenance of a viable 
agricultural sector an important policy goal with or without farm lobby prodding”299. The 
dismantlement of supply management could have detrimental effect on the viability of the sectors 
currently under supply management. Canada may continue to defend supply management in part 
to assure the persistence of lively rural communities and the survival of these farms. 
Even though the Doha Round is at an impasse at the moment and talks are indefinitely 
suspended, Canada is sending a faint signal that its position could change. Indeed, the Harper 
government has been hinting at a shift in policy. The federal government first dismantled the 
Canadian Wheat Board in 2012, the other main protectionist system in Canadian agriculture with 
supply management, and which the Canadian government was defending at the GATT and WTO 
before it broke its monopoly. Second, the members of the Trans-Pacific-Partnership and the 
European Union, with whom Canada is currently negotiating trade agreements, are strongly 
opposed to Canadian supply management. The Harper government has been subtly suggesting 
that supply management could be put on the negotiation table, stating that we would otherwise be 
prevented from accessing markets of several million consumers. Very recently the government 
297 Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations. 
298 Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs and Paradigms.” 
299 Wilson, Farming the System, 139. 
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 announced possible concessions in the cheese market within the context of the trade agreement 
with the EU. The possible shift in the Canadian position, or its maintenance despite new 
mounting pressures, renders the subject even more relevant. 
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 APPENDIX A 
Active countries in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round300 
 
Argentina (Cairns Group, G-20) 
Australia (Cairns Group coordinator) 
Benin (Cotton-4, African Group, least-developed, Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) 
Brazil (G-20 coordinator, also Cairns) 
Burkina Faso (Cotton-4 coordinator, also African Group, least-developed, ACP) 
Canada (Cairns) 
China (G-33, G-20, recent new member) 
Colombia (Cairns, tropical products group) 
Costa Rica (tropical products coordinator, also Cairns) 
Côte d’Ivoire (African Group coordinator, also ACP) 
Cuba (G-33, small and vulnerable economies) 
Dominican Republic (small-vulnerable economies coordinator, also G-33) 
Ecuador (tropical products, recent new member) 
Egypt (G-20, African Group) 
EU 
India (G-33, G-20) 
Indonesia (G-33 coordinator, also G-20, Cairns) 
Jamaica (ACP coordinator, also G-33, small-vulnerable) 
Japan (G-10) 
Kenya (G-33, African, ACP) 
300  “Agriculture Negotiations – Where and Who,” WTO, accessed July 5, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm. 
129 
 
                                                          
 Rep. Korea (G-33, G-10) 
Lesotho (least-developed countries coordinator, also African Group, ACP) 
Mauritius (G-33, ACP, African) 
Malaysia (Cairns) 
Mexico (G-20) 
New Zealand (Cairns) 
Norway (G-10) 
Pakistan (Cairns, G-20, G-33) 
Paraguay (Cairns, G-20, tropical products, small-vulnerable) 
Philippines (G-33, G-20, Cairns) 
Switzerland (G-10 coordinator) 
Chinese Taipei (recent new members coordinator, also G–10) 
Thailand (Cairns, G-20) 
Turkey (G-33) 
Uruguay (Cairns, G-20) 
US 
Venezuela (G-33, G-20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
 APPENDIX B 
Organizations surveyed 
 
National general organizations 
Canadian Federation of Agriculture 
National Farmers Union 
 
Provincial general organizations 
Union des producteurs agricoles (Quebec) 
Ontario Federation of Agriculture 
Keystone Agricultural Producers (Manitoba) 
Agricultural Producers of Saskatchewan 
Alberta Federation of Agriculture 
BC Agriculture Council 
 
National sectoral organizations 
Dairy Farmers of Canada 
Chicken Farmers of Canada 
Egg Farmers of Canada 
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association 
Canadian Pork Council 
Grain Growers of Canada 
Canadian Canola Growers Association 
Canadian Soybean Council 
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 Provincial sectoral organizations 
Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec (dairy) 
Fédération des producteurs d’œufs de consommation du Québec (consumption eggs) 
Syndicat des producteurs d’œufs d’incubation du Québec (hatching eggs) 
Les Éleveurs de volailles du Québec (chicken) 
Fédération des producteurs de porcs du Québec (hog) 
Fédération des producteurs de bovins du Québec (cattle) 
Dairy Farmers of Ontario 
Chicken Farmers of Ontario 
Egg Farmers of Ontario 
Ontario Pork 
Ontario Cattlemen’s Association 
Dairy Farmers of Manitoba 
Manitoba Chicken Producers 
Manitoba Egg Farmers 
SaskMilk 
Chicken Farmers of Saskatchewan 
Saskatchewan Egg Producers 
Alberta Milk 
Alberta Chicken Producers 
Egg Farmers of Alberta 
BC Dairy Association 
BC Chicken Growers’ Association 
BC Egg Producers’ Association 
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 APPENDIX C 
Cover letter and survey sent to farmers’ organizations 
 
 
 
[Date] 
[Postal address of organization] 
Dear [name of chair or executive director of organization], 
I am a graduate student doing research on Canadian agricultural policy, with a particular interest 
in supply management. I am completing a Masters’ degree in Political Science at the University 
of Waterloo, Ontario, under the supervision of Dr. William Coleman. I would like to ask for your 
collaboration for data collection needed for my thesis by completing the enclosed questionnaire.  
My thesis focuses on the position the Canadian government has been holding in the agricultural 
trade negotiations of the Uruguay (1986-94) and Doha (2001-) rounds of the World Trade 
Organization, particularly as it bears upon supply management. I am trying to understand how 
this position has been developed and the factors that have influenced its elaboration. I am 
particularly interested in the domestic dynamics that take place in the Canadian agricultural 
sector over this issue.  
An important part of my research focuses on farmers’ organizations, because they are prominent 
participants in the elaboration of agricultural policy. I am trying to better understand how 
important and influential farmers’ organizations are, the power dynamics that occur between 
them, and the nature of the relationships they develop with government.  
The data will be used to better understand the characteristics of farmers’ organizations. I 
therefore hope to have your collaboration in this endeavour. I have consulted your website, which 
provided me with some useful information, but several of my questions remain unanswered. The 
completion of the survey should take approximately one to two hours. Accordingly, I would very 
much appreciate if you could provide me with answers to the questions in the following pages 
and return the survey to the mailing address given at the end of the questionnaire. A copy of this 
survey has also been sent to you by email and you can send it back by email if you prefer. 
Although the questionnaire is addressed to you, feel free to have another employee fill the 
questionnaire if you think it is more appropriate. 
 
If you choose to take part in my research study, your responses will be considered confidential 
and I will ensure that the project data is securely stored. The data will be retained for at least two 
years or for any extensions of this research.Your anonymity as a research study participant will 
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 be safeguarded. I will not present my findings in a way that you or your organization can be 
identified.  You can choose not to answer particular questions if you wish. You can withdraw 
from the study at any time by notifying me. 
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me. In any case, I will contact you in the 
following ten days to follow-up. Or if your wish to provide me with some of this information 
over the telephone, I will be open to this possibility. I will also be pleased to provide you with the 
final findings of my research, when I have completed my thesis. If you have questions you would 
like to ask Dr. Coleman, my faculty supervisor, here are his email address and office phone 
number: wdcolema@uwaterloo.ca / 519.888.4567, ext. 38893. 
My project has received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics (ORE) of the 
University of Waterloo. If you have comments or concerns resulting from your involvement in 
the project, you can contact the ORE Director, Maureen Nummelin (519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 / 
maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca). The final decision about participation is yours. 
 
Best regards, 
Jasmine Bélanger-Gulick 
 
Candidate, M.A. Political Science 
University of Waterloo 
jasmine.belanger-gulick@uwaterloo.ca 
 
 
 
 
 
Please send the filled survey back to the following address: 
 
Att. Jasmine Bélanger-Gulick 
Political Science Department 
Room HH 314 
University of Waterloo 
200 University Avenue West 
Waterloo (ON) N2L 3G1 
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 Biographical note 
 
I am currently completing a Masters’ degree in Political Science at the University of Waterloo, 
Ontario. I am there working under the supervision of Dr. William D. Coleman, who worked 
extensively on Canadian agricultural policy, and more specifically farmers’ organizations, 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. I obtained a Bachelor’s degree in International Studies from the 
University of Montreal in 2012. My research interests are focused on agricultural issues, most 
notably agricultural trade and food sovereignty. I myself grew up on a farm in the Eastern 
Townships, Quebec. Living and working on the farm, I have always been interested in the 
challenges facing the Canadian agricultural sector.  
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 Survey 
 
Name of the respondent: _____________________________________________________ 
Responsibility within the organization: _________________________________________ 
Email address and work telephone number of the respondent: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Membership 
1) How many individual members did your organization have in 2012? 
 Number: _____________ 
 
2) In relation to the total number of potential farmers you could represent, can you estimate what 
proportion of this number were members of the organization in 2012? 
 
 □ 0-10%     
 □11-20%  
 □ 21-30%   
 □ 31-40%   
 □ 41-50%   
 □ 51-60%   
 □ 61-70%   
 □ 71-80%   
 □ 81-90%   
 □ 91-100%   
 □ I don’t know 
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 3) Do you consider you are currently in competition with another organization for membership 
(to recruit members)?  
 □ Yes. Please specify the organization: ___________________________________ 
 □ No 
 □ I don’t know 
 
Organization budget and employees 
 
4) Still thinking of 2012, approximately what is your annual expenditures budget for your 
organization in the year? 
___________________ CAN$ 
 
5) What was your principal source of funding in 2012? What percentage of your total funding is 
provided by this main source? Check one. 
 
 □ Membership contributions: _____ % 
 □ Sales of goods and services: _____ % 
 □ Voluntary donations and interest: _____ %  
 □ Grants from government or other organizations.  
    Please specify name if you can: ______________________________( _____ %) 
□ Others: _______________________________________ ( _____ %)  
 
6) How many full-time employees did the organization count in 2012? 
 Number: __________ 
 
7) Could you send me a copy of the organizational structure diagram of your organization?  
 □ Yes and documentation is (circle) included in this envelope / sent by email  
 □ Yes, other: _______________________________________________________ 
 □ No 
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 Public positions, collaboration and international trade 
8) Do you regularly collaborate with other organizations to develop policy briefs to present to the 
federal government or to relevant provincial governments? 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 
9) If so, which other organizations do you most regularly work with? Please list starting with the 
organization you most regularly work with. 
  - _______________________________________________ 
  - _______________________________________________ 
  - _______________________________________________ 
  - _______________________________________________ 
  - _______________________________________________ 
 
10) Does your organization belong to any coalitions of groups or strategic alliances that focus 
specifically on issues of international agricultural trade or trade negotiations? Which ones? Please 
list starting with the coalition or alliance most valued by your organization. 
 □ Yes: ___________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________ 
 □ No 
 
11) Does your organization have a committee or a branch dedicated to international trade or 
international agricultural negotiations?  
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 
12) When you think of all the provincial [dairy/chicken/egg/cattle/hog/grain] farmers’ 
organizations, would you say one or several provinces exert more influence on the agenda than 
others in shaping policy decisions?  
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
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 13) If so, which ones? On what basis do you make your assessment? Please expand. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Relation with government 
14) To what degree has your organization participated in a governmental consultative process or 
attended a meeting of a legislative committee on agricultural issues in the last 10 years? Did any 
of these activities relate to supply management? If so, what was the purpose of your organization 
attending? Please expand. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15) With which federal ministry do you interact with most frequently?   
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16) What term would you use to describe the nature of your relationship with this federal 
ministry (collaborative, antagonistic, cordial, other)? 
 
17) With which provincial ministry do you interact with most frequently?  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18) What term would you use to describe the nature of your relationship with this provincial 
ministry (collaborative, antagonistic, cordial, other)? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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 Agricultural trade negotiations 
19) When it comes to influencing the position of the federal government in the Doha Round 
agricultural negotiations, which other organization(s) do you feel you are in competition with 
when trying to influence the government, if any? Please explain. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20) When it came to influencing the position on agricultural trade of the federal government in 
the Uruguay Round, do you feel you were in competition with the same organization(s)?  
 □ Yes 
 □ No  
 
21) If not, with which organizations did you feel in competition with in relation to the Uruguay 
round and how do you explain the change? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
22) Do you agree or disagree with the position the government of Canada has been advocating on 
supply management in the agricultural trade negotiations of the Doha Round? Please elaborate. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The above, and any other information on your organization that you believe would aid my 
research, will be most helpful. I wish to thank you very much for your assistance. I may re-
contact you to ask for further clarification on your answers.  
 
Jasmine Bélanger-Gulick 
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 APPENDIX D 
Membership of organizations in decreasing order, selection of supply and non-supply-managed 
provincial and national farmers’ organizations 
 
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association 
Grain Growers of Canada 
Ontario Cattlemen’s Association 
Dairy Farmers of Canada 
Fédération des producteurs de bovins du Québec 
Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec 
Dairy Farmers of Ontario 
Fédération des producteurs de porc du Québec 
Chicken Farmers of Canada 
Ontario Pork 
Egg Farmers of Canada 
Chicken Farmers of Ontario 
Éleveurs de volailles du Québec 
Alberta Milk 
BC Dairy 
BC Chicken Growers' Association 
Dairy Farmers of Manitoba 
Alberta Chicken Producers 
Manitoba Egg Farmers 
Sask Milk 
Egg Farmers of Alberta 
BC Egg Producers' Association 
Fédération des producteurs d’oeufs de consummation du Québec 
Chicken Farmers of Saskatchewan 
 
*Missing data:  Canadian Pork Council, Manitoba Chicken Producers, Saskatchewan Egg 
Producers, Egg Farmers of Ontario 
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 APPENDIX E 
Annual expenditure budget of organizations in decreasing order, selection of supply and non-
supply-managed provincial and national farmers’ organizations 
 
Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec 
Egg Farmers of Canada 
Dairy Farmers of Ontario 
Fédération des producteurs de porc du Québec 
Alberta Milk 
Éleveurs de volailles du Québec 
Chicken Farmers of Ontario 
Chicken Farmers of Canada 
Ontario Pork 
Fédération des producteurs de bovins du Québec 
BC Egg Producers 
Sask Milk 
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association 
Canadian Pork Council 
Ontario Cattlemen’s Association 
Alberta Chicken Producers 
Egg Farmers of Alberta 
Chicken Farmers of Saskatchewan 
Grain Growers of Canada 
 
*Missing data:  Dairy Farmers of Canada, Dairy Farmers of Manitoba, BC Dairy, BC Chicken 
Growers' Association, Manitoba Chicken Producers, Fédération des producteurs 
d’oeufs de consummation du Québec, Saskatchewan Egg Producers, Egg 
Farmers of Ontario, Manitoba Egg Farmers 
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 APPENDIX F 
Number of permanent employees of organizations in decreasing order, selection of supply and 
non-supply-managed provincial and national farmers’ organizations 
 
Dairy Farmers of Ontario 
Fédération des producteurs de porc du Québec 
Egg Farmers of Canada 
Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec 
Fédération des producteurs de bovins du Québec 
Chicken Farmers of Ontario 
Alberta Milk 
Éleveurs de volailles du Québec 
Chicken Farmers of Canada 
BC Dairy 
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association 
Fédération des producteurs d’oeufs de consommation du Québec 
Manitoba Egg Farmers 
Ontario Cattlemen’s Association 
Egg Farmers of Alberta 
Sask Milk 
Alberta Chicken Producers 
Manitoba Chicken Producers 
Chicken Farmers of Saskatchewan 
BC Egg Producers' Association 
 
*Missing data:  Dairy Farmers of Canada, Canadian Pork Council, Dairy Farmers of Manitoba, 
BC Chicken Growers' Association, Saskatchewan Egg Producers, Egg Farmers 
of Ontario, Ontario Pork 
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 APPENDIX G 
Members of the Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance 
 
 
Alberta Barley Commission 
Alberta Beef Producers 
Alberta Cattle Feeders’ Association 
CCGA 
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association 
Canadian Meat Council 
Canadian Sugar Institute 
Canola Council 
Grain Growers of Canada 
Canadian Pork Council 
Malting Industry Association of Canada 
National Cattle Feeders’ Association 
Canada Pork International 
Western Grain Elevator Association 
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 APPENDIX H 
Distribution of farm cash receipts, Western provinces and Canada 
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